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WHAT Austria-Hungary is to get out of the compact of the Kaisers is military support, not, as in the case of the old Austro-German alliance, against Russia or any other foreign country, but against the insurgent forces at home. For some time it has been plain that the German and Magyar sections of the Dual Empire could not much longer hold in subjection the Czech, Jugoslav and Latin nationalities. Left to herself, the Dual Empire would have to face seriously the alternatives of federalization or dissolution. Federation would imply the ultimate political predominance of the Slavic elements, who in another half century will constitute a decisive majority of the population. And even so, it may be that the opportunity of solving the Austro-Hungarian problem of federation has lapsed. If then the Germans and Magyars of the empire wish to retain their old political privileges, they must commend themselves to the German Kaiser as weak barons of the Middle Ages commended themselves to the greater lords. But this is the end of Austro-Hungarian independence. The old empire of the Hapsburgs, once confident of its destiny to rule the world, falls to the rank of a subject state. The Central European political unit comes into existence not by mutual consent, as Naumann proposed, but by Germany's conquest of her allies. How long the Central European unit will endure, however, depends upon the course of events on the western front.

ALONG with the military compact the Kaisers agreed upon a scheme of economic unity. Economic relations, to be sure, lie beyond the constitutional sphere of the Teutonic monarchs, but this does not rob their action of significance. There will be no difficulty in Germany in securing parliamentary ratification of an arrangement that makes out of Austria-Hungary an economic sphere of influence. As German industry has a long lead, besides possessing all the permanent advantages of superior resources, a customs union would condemn the Dual Empire to the role of a closed market, supplying raw materials and taking manufactures in return. Hungary before the war was especially eager to develop toward economic self-sufficiency. She was restless under the commercial arrangements with Austria that exposed her weak industries to the competition of other parts of the Dual Empire. It is therefore not to be supposed that she will accept cheerfully an arrangement by which her industry must perish under the overwhelming competition of the Germans. But this is a part of the price she must pay if she wishes German support in her oppression of the Slavic nationalities.

GERMANY can conceive of the process of internationalism only in terms of the absorption by the greater states of the lesser ones. Modern industry is constructed on so large a scheme that it tends to overflow the boundaries even of considerable empires. Make the empires larger, then, is Germany's solution. And she seizes upon the

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opportunity of Austria's weakness to advance her peculiar scheme of internationalization. The democratic nations have a quite different conception. They realize, too, that the modern industrial system refuses to be confined within the political boundaries of a single state. But they do not conceive that the boundaries of the political unit must necessarily coincide with those of the economic unit. World economy does not, in the Allied view, imply world dominion. It does imply some form of world organization. We have at present what amounts to a world organization for the suppression of a predatory group of outlaw states. In consequence the world is aroused, as never before, to the essential interdependence of states which wish to live in peace. This means that the present offers an unprecedented opportunity for establishing on a permanent basis an organization of peace loving states. Are our statesmen as actively at work in laying the foundations for a democratic internationalism as the German statesmen are in preparing for the internationalism of imperial subjection? Or are our leaders, as in so many other instances, relying upon the moral superiority of our cause to make up for their failure to seize upon opportunities when they are ripest?

ONE of the most baffling problems of European diplomacy appears well on its way toward a satisfactory solution through the informal agreement between the Jugo-Slavs and a committee representative of the Italian Chamber and Senate. By this agreement Italy renounces her claim to Jugo-Slav territory on the Dalmatian coast, and the Jugo-Slavs in turn recognize Italy's right to the territories inhabited by Italians subject to the Dual Empire. Such an arrangement removes one of the most formidable obstacles to the creation of a unified Jugo-Slav state. Under the imperialistic scheme of things that the war is demolishing, the Jugo-Slavs had to keep a watchful eye upon both Italy and Austria. They expected the Dual Empire sooner or later to fall to pieces; but they had reason to fear that some of the lands rightfully theirs would be seized by the newer and more vital Italian state. This danger has now disappeared, if, as we seem justified in assuming, the new treaty between Italy and her allies follows the lines of the informal agreement so far as Jugo-Slav claims are concerned. It is an equitable arrangement and also an expedient one. Italy abandons her aspiration to make the Adriatic an Italian lake, but she gains a fast friend capable of defending the littoral against the aggressions of a common foe far more successfully than Italy herself could do, planted as she would be on a precariously thin fringe of alien coast.

IT is to be hoped that an equally honorable international spirit has been applied to the relations between Italy and Greece. So long as Italy followed the ways of the old imperialism she regarded Greece as an inconvenient lesser rival in the eastern Mediterranean, to be humiliated and exploited in the interest of Italy's more grandiose designs. In Epirus, in the Ionian Islands and in the Dodecanese, Italy meant to seize or to hold purely Greek territory. In the event of the break-up of Turkey, Italy aimed to secure for herself most of the Greek lands of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. It appears to be quite conclusively established that but for Russian and potential Italian opposition, Greece would have joined the Allies at once, with no other condition than the obvious one that her representative should sit in the peace conference and present the claims of Greece. We are paying still for the rebuff to Greece at the instance of Russian and Italian imperialists. But we are now living under a new dispensation. No Greek interest is menaced by Russia, and Italy, having renounced her original designs upon Jugo-Slav territory, is doubtless in a mood to make fair terms with Greece, now at last fighting by the side of the Allies. We may at any rate safely assume that some provision has been made for justice to Greece in the new Allied treaty, the terms of which ought not to remain secret.

A RECENT issue of the Survey contained an interesting account by Mr. Arthur Gleason of the impression produced on British liberals and labor men by the American labor delegation. We gather that the impression has not been altogether fortunate. The American delegation was sent abroad because of a difference of opinion between the American and the inter-Allied labor parties over the proposed inter-belligerent conference. When you have a difference of opinion with a friend and associate, your natural course is to talk it over for the purpose, if possible, of reaching an agreement. But the American labor committee did not go abroad, or at least did not create an impression on their French and British colleagues of having gone abroad, for the purpose of discussing a difference of opinion and of reaching an agreement. They behaved as if their mission was to convince the misguided foreigners how wrong it is to differ with Americans. Considering that these particular foreigners had worked and sacrificed in the Allied cause for almost four years and had arrived at their convictions and policy only after prolonged and anxious consideration, they could hardly fail to resent the cocksureness, lack of consideration and understanding shown by the American labor visitors.

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THEIR resentment was the more natural because the American delegation impressed their British colleagues as having failed to understand the democratic peace policy to which it was vainly invited to lend its support. The difference between the two labor groups is only one of method. It could in all probability have been adjusted, provided the American delegation had not assumed the attitude that there was nothing to discuss. As it was, the breach is greater than it was six weeks ago, and the French and British labor men are more than ever determined to see their own policy through but far less hopeful of making it a success. Their object has been to keep a great mass of weary and enervated wage-earners loyal to the war during the peace discussions which will follow the end of the German offensive. Instead of being aided in the accomplishment of this object by their own and by the American government they have been thwarted. The consequences will be that many wage-earners will when the critical moment comes unite with the increasing body of upper-class moderates who are willing to entertain the idea of a compromise peace. A recent election in an industrial constituency developed a vote of 33 per cent of the total in favor of a candidate who proposed immediate peace negotiations. It is leaders like Henderson and Thomas who are the most effective opponents of this pacifist tendency. Yet in their attempt to keep the wage-earners faithful to the war, they meet with no support from the American unions and with no attempt to understand the motives of their proposed policy.

THE situation in Ireland is growing worse rather than better. Ever since military law went into effect, following the rebellion of 1916, the political strain has been gravely increasing, and it only needed the crucial offensive to create a tension which is trying the leaders and the people of both England and Ireland to the limit. It is not, as some newspapers think, simply a question of dealing with traitorous Sinn Fein extremists, a question of "muscular" and determined action. It is freely intimated that certain of the Sinn Fein leaders effected a cooperation with Germany, but whatever aid Germany has found among such rebels as were willing to seek such aid and competent to secure it, the large help that Germany prays for is the substitution of muscle for brain, on both sides. Under the circumstances nothing is more dangerous than a wholesale condemnation of Sinn Fein. Seven months ago the editor of the English Review wrote, after many arrests had been made and heavy sentences passed under military law, "the situation is full of unpleasant possibilities, and that because Sinn Fein is treated as a rebel organization, though, as a fact, it probably represents seventy-five per cent of non-Ulster Ireland. The result is friction, suspicion, and espionage." The unpleasant possibilities are unfortunately not less remote today.

WHAT is needed least of all at the present moment is the precipitancy of panic. It is quite clear to the whole world that if there is evidence of treasonable conspiracy, the public of Ireland as well as England must be brought to recognize it, and the extreme gravity of such intentions made patent. But a train of lamentable circumstances has been laid since 95,000 Catholic Irish volunteers enlisted to fight in the first months of this war. No one has condemned the management of Irish recruiting more vigorously than Lloyd George; and the succession of events since the first free enlistment has gone far to confirm the nationalist idea that there is a grotesque contrast between the self-determination held aloft by President Wilson as an object of the war and England's failure to give Ireland self-determination in regard to the most vital policies. On this point, during the present mood, little can be accomplished. England is sorely tried, and impatience, even hysteria, is dogging the heels of judgment. On both sides hang fundamental issues, with passionate incentives to recklessness in each case. The first step toward avoiding that recklessness is to subdue rumor and deal with evidence, disregarding completely the fiction that this is a "domestic" issue of law and order.

AN additional illustration of the strong tendency of Socialists to rally to the war is afforded by a manifesto just issued by thirty-five "more or less prominent" members of that party in Chicago. The group considers the moral appeal of the cause of the Allies to have been very much increased by the programmes of the Inter-Allied Socialists and Labor Conference and of the British Labor party, by the Brest-Litovsk treaties, by the announced determination of President Wilson to stand by Russia, and by the steadily increasing power and influence of the Socialist and Labor groups in all the Allied nations of Europe. They consider these changes to be of such decisive importance that they are now "inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved." They urge upon all American Socialists to agitate in favor of this policy within the local organizations and to call for a general referendum of the party membership on the question of opposing or supporting the war. They propose shortly to submit a resolution which if adopted by a sufficient number of locals will accomplish this result and they urge all Socialists who

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are in sympathy with these views to communicate with Carl D. Thompson, 4131 North Keeler Avenue, Chicago. Such appeals are extremely significant. With the expenditure of a little tact and consideration on the part of the government the Socialist opposition to the war, which began by being so formidable, can be reduced to negligibility.

PRESIDENT WILSON may be fully justified in opposing the constitution of a standing congressional committee on the conduct of the war. Such a committee, unless its members exercised its powers with inconceivable moderation, would seriously interfere with the ability of the executive officials to place at the disposal of the nation their best services. It is not the business of Congress to supervise in detail administrative methods. But it is the business of Congress to insist on getting results and for that reason the President will not, we trust, discourage specific investigations undertaken by regular congressional committees into the work of the departments. Such investigations may at times be irritating and disconcerting. They may consume time which could be better employed by an overworked and tired official in trying to catch up with the routine of his regular duties. Nevertheless in a democratic government they are a necessary evil. Administrative officials need to be held to a strict accountability for results, even when they are working under conditions which place almost insuperable obstacles in the way of obtaining wholly satisfactory results, and the only method by which such accountability can be enforced is that of publicity, and the most effective agency of publicity is congressional inquisitions. The President and Congress ought to be able to reach an agreement on the scope and the frequency of these investigations. Without such agreement there can be no sufficient confidence and cooperation between the two branches of the government.

THE decision of the government to put a fleet of barges on the Erie canal, and thus to divert from the railways a considerable part of the traffic with which they are now overtaxed, offers a hope that we may at last secure adequate data on the economic value of canal transportation. When New York undertook the deepening of the canal, persons of sanguine temperament predicted a new era of transportation, a tremendous stimulus to the commerce of New York City. But the removal of the last section of earth in the canal prism found private enterprise wholly apathetic in its attitude toward the canal. Although the state had provided an excellent waterway that could be used free of charge, nobody cared to risk his capital in the construction of barges for service on it. The reason for this, obviously, was the danger that the railways would make rates so low that the canal boats could not earn tonnage charges. At present, with both the railways and the canal under a common management there can be no question of competitive rates. Cost of service and speed of shipment will determine the distribution of freight between the railways and the canal. If the traffic does not exhibit satisfactory results under these conditions, the canal will have proved itself obsolete.

YOU will find all sorts of good things in the official publication of the American Expeditionary Forces, entitled the Stars and Stripes. It appears once a week, being written, printed and issued behind the lines in France. You will find an editorial, explaining and approving a recent order forbidding conversation with prisoners of war. "Leave the talking to war prisoners to the men intrusted with that work; that's their business," says the editor, "and a mighty useful one. Any further conversation with captives musses up the game." From F. P. A.'s column you discover that he is already acclimated and as cheerful as ever. Humor and good humor are everywhere—in news, editorials, letters from soldiers, and in such headlines as these which we take from the sporting page: "Huns Hit .000 Against Lorraine Hurlers"—"Huns May Request Waivers on Kaiser." We do not believe there is a more American publication in the world.

The Worthy Victory

TOWARDS the end of last week the advocates of the League to Enforce Peace held a convention in Philadelphia whose object was to insist on victory in the war as an indispensable agency of permanent peace. In associating the winning of the war with securities for permanent peace, the convention was giving expression to the aspiration which has been implicit in the case of the Allies from the beginning and which since the entrance of America has gained the dignity of a positive purpose. President Lowell of Harvard was only summing up the almost unanimous conclusion of political as opposed to military thinkers in predicting that another great war could scarcely avoid becoming "a war of extermination." "Civilization," he said, "as we know it has reached a point where it must preclude war or perish by war, and war can be precluded only by a conquest of the world by a single power or by an organization of many nations to prevent its recurrence." Under the leadership of President Wilson the American people are now fighting to bring into existence a

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society of nations bound together by the constructive purpose of world pacification. America will have won the war in case and only in case there can be brought into existence at its end an effective league "to prevent its recurrence."

There are, however, many ardent supporters of the war who agree with President Lowell in his interpretation of the test of victory but who would not agree with the method whereby alone some of his associates propose to realize it. "There is but one way," says Professor Franklin H. Giddings, "to establish an enduring peace," which is the "unconditional surrender" of Germany. This assertion can only have one meaning. No matter how reasonable were any terms of peace which Germany might voluntarily offer, they should be rejected because they would not be born of an overwhelming military defeat and of an unconditional surrender. The war will be lost unless the peace terms are imposed upon a helpless Germany at the point of the sword, and without the need of consulting any German government. In adopting this attitude Professor Giddings is placing himself in opposition to the official policy both of Great Britain and the United States. In the same newspapers which reported the Giddings speech there was printed a speech of Mr. Balfour's in which he said: "If any representative of any belligerent country desires seriously to lay before us any proposals, we are ready to listen to them." In making this statement Mr. Balfour was only following Mr. Wilson who declared in Baltimore his readiness to discuss "a fair, just and honest peace at any time it is seriously proposed."

Inasmuch as Germany has no apparent intention at the present time of proposing a fair, just and honest peace, the difference in the attitude of Mr. Lowell and his associates and that of the President and Mr. Balfour may seem to be academic; but that is precisely what it is not. The difference is intensely practical. The President's policy converts the political and moral strength of the cause of the Allies into a military asset and the moral weakness of the German cause into a military liability. It is calculated to achieve victory with the smallest possible expenditure of treasure and blood and to reenforce the association between military victory and the subsequent organization of international peace. On the other hand the policy of insisting in advance on "unconditional surrender" has none of these merits. It is the course which the Allies would have to adopt in case their cause were bad, but which it is wholly unnecessary for any belligerent to adopt whose cause is good. It would tend to cultivate a defense psychology in the German people and prolong and consolidate to the limit their power of physical and moral endurance. No German would believe that an enemy which insisted on "unconditional surrender" would fail to take unfair advantage of their helplessness; and considering the provisions of the secret treaties they can hardly be blamed for laboring under such suspicions. The Allies consequently would be throwing away the benefit which they are capable of securing from the essential justice of their political objects. Inasmuch as they are planning to organize an international society, in which a well behaved Germany would share with other nations the privileges as well as the responsibilities of world citizenship, why attach to victory a purely military meaning which disregards the ultimately disinterested and conciliatory nature of the political purpose of the Allies?

The alternative method of using political as well as military weapons in order to win the war does not, as President Lowell seems to believe, serve an inconclusive or a compromising peace. The British and the French labor leaders who have been the most eager and thorough-going advocates of these tactics are as resolute as Professor Giddings to prevent Imperial Germany from emerging at the end of the war with any of the fruits of victory. They will fight indefinitely in order to force the German government to renounce the annexationist ambitions which are so clearly revealed in the Eastern treaties. They will never negotiate with a German government which means by negotiation an unprincipled trading of territories and economic franchises. They have already formulated a proposed treaty of peace which if it can be put into effect would clearly involve the defeat of German imperialism, while at the same time guaranteeing to a reformed Germany security and the opportunities identical with those to be enjoyed by her present enemies. These proposed peace terms, that is, would secure all the political objects associated with the organization of a society of nations which the Allies could impose upon Germany as a consequence of "unconditional surrender," without necessarily involving the humiliation and helplessness of such a surrender. Their attitude is uncompromising to the limit but it is not unconciliatory. While willing to fight until the political objects of the war are secured, they keep open the alternative of ceasing to fight just as soon as these objects can be secured without further bloodshed.

By keeping open the alternative of ceasing to fight whenever the essential political result can be accomplished without further bloodshed, the Allied governments would merely be themselves giving expression to the spirit of ultimate conciliation which must come to prevail throughout the world in case the war for permanent peace is to be won. The organization of international peace as the

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result of a successful war is probably the most formidable task of political construction as yet undertaken by mankind. Its difficulties are stubborn, elusive and innumerable. Unless statesmen tread warily and plan wisely it will prove to be impossible. It involves two almost equally insidious and fatal dangers. On the one hand, a war whose moral purpose is derived from a hatred of war may not be waged with the grim determination which is called for by the use of so terrible an instrument. On the other hand, a pacifist programme which can be put into effect only after a successful war may itself be impaired or perverted by the ugly weapon which its supporters are obliged to use. President Lowell and his associates are very much alive to the first of these dangers and we would not for one moment pretend that they have not reason for their apprehensions. But they have less reason than formerly, because the Russian treaties converted many Americans, Englishmen and Frenchmen of pacifist and internationalist convictions to complete acquiescence in the policy of fighting Germany until their rulers were ready to abandon a policy of conquest and exploitation. At the present time there is more danger that the programme of ultimate pacification may be falsified by the military instrument and spirit which its advocates are obliged to create than that there is of any disposition, at least among Americans, to relax the grip on the sword before Germany is brought to terms.

A democracy which is fighting for essentially pacific purposes needs to retain even in the midst of so destructive a war its faith in the principle of government by consent and its belief in the ultimate ability of moral ideals to overcome force. It is this faith which gives vitality to its domestic body politic. As President Wilson said in his Red Cross speech we have not only to win this war but "to win it greatly and worthily." One way in which America can earn this "greater victory" is to remain consciously and resolutely true to the spirit of its own democracy. The German government has thrust the sword into American hands, and it must be made to realize that it cannot provoke American enmity with impunity. But we need not ourselves imitate the Germans and overrate what we can accomplish by the use of the sword. Its only power for good is that of removing obstacles to the structure of human goodwill, which those who believe in the possibility of permanent peace are seeking to rear. The structure itself must be reared by artizans of democracy who work in a different spirit, with different materials. They are entitled to insist upon associating victory with the results which they can accomplish through political instruments no less than with the results which the soldier can accomplish by the sword.

Standing by Russia

ONCE more President Wilson has given voice to his determination—and the determination of the mass of the American people—to stand by Russia as we are determined to stand by France. Embedded in the context of the Red Cross address, this declaration might be thought to have no other significance than the application to a wounded and oppressed nation of the general principles of the society of mercy. It is more probable, however, that President Wilson intended his words to have also another effect.

A German peace offensive is in the air. Its objective, we may be quite certain, will be to divide the Allies and so conquer. Why, the Germans are insinuating, should the western Allies concern themselves about the fate of a nation that has failed them in their need? Why should they bolster up a state that has fallen into the hands of a party whose principles are subversive of all order as the western Allies and the Germans alike conceive of order? Suppose Germany were given a free hand in Russia, would not the best elements in Russian society rejoice? And in compensation for this concession in Russia—a concession costing none of the western Allies anything—Germany might consent to a "rectification" of frontiers to the advantage of France, to an indemnification of Belgium for her material losses, though not for her wrongs, to the recovery by Italy of her unredeemed provinces, at the expense of Austria. It is a seductive argument. It points not to peace without victory, but to peace with victory for both contestants. The western Allies could under such an arrangement claim victory, looking to results in France, Belgium and Italy. The Germans could claim victory, looking to results on the Russian and Rumanian border. A seductive argument, but President Wilson has announced to the world that he is cognizant of its insincerity. America may be new to the ways of the European diplomatic scheme, but her eyes are clear.

But if we are to stand by Russia, refusing to purchase peace at her expense, should we not demand in return that Russia organize herself in such a way that she can take an effective part in repelling German aggression? Should we not insist that the present revolutionary government give way to another which would utilize the services of the "best people" and draw them back from their leanings toward Germany? They are not pro-German by choice. But their interests, threatened by the revolution, are colossal. In the Ukraine, aristocratic land holdings run from forty to seventy per cent of all land capable of utilization, and include the better lands. In Great Russia the aristo-

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cratic holding is even more predominant. And even these figures lead to an underestimate of the aristocratic interests now in jeopardy. Neither the peasant holding in the Ukraine nor the communal allotment in Great Russia suffices to maintain the peasant. It is little more than a cottar's allotment on which the rural laborer can earn part of his living and so be able to work on the large estate for next to nothing. The large Russian landholders —the "best people"—were in a position before the war to appropriate to themselves practically the whole surplus production of Russian agriculture, and Russian agriculture absorbs nine-tenths of the labor power of the Russian state.

Beyond the surplus of agriculture, the "best people" held the offices, both civil and military, and shared the professions and business with the Germans and the Jews. This may suffice for a measure of what they stand to lose unless the government of the councils of peasants and workmen is overthrown. It is an enormous stake, and it is not to be wondered that in their fear of losing it they turn desperately now to the Germans, now to the Allies and organize throughout the whole world an anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Their own forces are too feeble to make head against the revolution. They were never more than a small fraction of the population, and, unlike the captain of industry of the western world, they are unable to point to an economic function performed to sanctify their privileges. They took much and gave little, relying upon the might of the Tsar and the people's anciently ingrained habits of submission to maintain their state.

But the Tsar has fallen and the habits of submission have broken up in universal disorder. The Germans or the Allies: such is the alternative for the Russian who has extensive privileges to defend. The German is nearer, more active, more sympathetic toward an aristocratic regime. But the German serves only for a price—all the traffic will bear. He is now absorbing Russian titles as fast as he can.

It is not to be denied that the soil of western nations is well prepared for the Russian counter-revolutionary propaganda. Russia's defection from the group of nations fighting Germany has been bitterly resented, and the relation of the revolution to the break-down of Russian resistance has been interpreted as one of simple cause and effect. It is impossible for most of us to realize the conditions under which a primitive agricultural state makes war. In such a state the livings of the people are wrested from the soil only by the unremitting toil of practically the whole population. Russia mobilized twenty million men—and lost seven million. These men were not drawn from non-essential industries, nor could there be, as in the case of an industrial state, a readjustment by which labor power drawn from non-essential industries could be applied to the purposes of war. An agricultural state is good for a brief war of mighty shocks: in a long protracted war it breaks down. Russia has broken down in every long war she has undertaken. This is nothing peculiar to Russia. Bulgaria succumbed to the same weakness in the second Balkan war, for the same reason. And most of the western European wars of the pre-industrial period ended not by decision on the field of battle but by exhaustion. Russia had fought herself out under the Tsar, and exhaustion and revolution followed. She will recover, but neither revolution nor counter-revolution could now place in the field armies comparable to those so extravagantly sunk in the Masurian swamps or driven to slaughter on the Galician plain.

We cannot hope for material military assistance from Russia in the near future. But the conflict now raging in the world will not be wholly extinguished by the peace. There will still be Germans dreaming of world empire, working to subject to their designs the vast resources of all the Russias. If the revolution altogether fails, the Germans will succeed. The counter revolutionary state will have to depend on German support; it can not stand alone, nor look to remoter allies. For an order stable by its inner force must rest upon a broader basis than the aristocratic caste now striving toward counter-revolution. Only out of the revolution itself, purged of its excesses, emancipated from impractical theories evolved in the heat of conflict, can come a Russia that will take its place among the free nations and help to secure the peace of the world.

We cannot advance the coming of the new Russia by coquetting with the counter-revolution, much as we may sympathize with the Russian classes harried by mob violence and plunged into penury. We can advance it by pursuing the policy of President Wilson. With President Wilson speaking for America, sooner or later the Russians must recognize her as their true friend, ready to throw all her resources into the defense of Russia against German aggression and asking for no national advantage in return. America's influence will then begin to count with the Russians on the side of moderation, order and humanity. But the movement toward a democratic and orderly state must come out of Russia herself. Let us recall that not foreign intervention, but her own internal force brought order out of revolutionary France. And if France went through untold horrors before order was restored, historians agree that the final result was worth the cost.

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The Rise of a New Profession

IT has taken the exigencies of war to bring home to employers the imperative need for expert administration of their labor problems. In the lazy times of peace, they were somehow able to muddle through. But the new war industries require not only men, but skilled men in excess of the available supply. Our industrial army is undergoing an expansion parallel to the expansion of our military force. The difference is that our industrial recruits cannot be shipped to France for training; our captains of industry face the necessity of providing expert training at home.

Today this expertness is being developed by high specialization, by setting up a fourth major department in the factory,—a personnel or employment management department to supplement the financial, production and sales departments. Executives competent to take charge of these personnel departments are consequently in great demand, and in response to this demand the War Department has instituted training classes for employment managers in a number of technical schools and universities. Simultaneous with the graduating exercises of the first of these classes at the University of Rochester, New York, the employment managers held their second annual convention. Contrasted with the modest group that first came together last year, eight hundred personnel executives attended this second annual convention of the National Employment Managers Association.

The birth of a national organization to sponsor the movement for trained personnel executives is tantamount to the birth of a new profession. It promises the development of a body of technique and method in the long neglected field of labor administration, for the competent application of which a rigorous professional training and professional status are essential. This is in line with the specializing tendency which in the last quarter century has created the professions of accountancy, industrial engineering and "scientific management."

But once this becomes the fact, once it is admitted that there is a body of technical knowledge capable of transmission, serious questions arise as to the field and controlling point of view of the new profession. The human equation is distinctly not of the same character as the problems of cost accounting, arrangement of machinery and routing of work. The handling of human beings, the adjustment of subtle human relationships, is fundamentally a problem where the interests served by the personnel executive and the ulterior motives animating his handling of men inevitably determine his point of view and procedure.

Can there, in the nature of the case, be a profession dedicated to the progressively sounder and sounder development of industrial technique if that profession is subsidized and controlled by one party to industry only,—the employer? There is an exigent place in industry for the interpreter. But can there be an honest and convincing interpretation if the interpreter is subject to the exclusive discretion of the vested management? Can there in this day and generation be a place for a profession of labor manipulation?

These questions are raised, as they were raised at the Rochester convention, not because anyone wants to check in its beginning a method of approach to labor administration which promises to uncover new and undreamed of opportunities for the application of science to human relationships in industry. On the contrary, everyone who has experienced the ineptness of current industrial policy or lack of policy in labor administration, welcomes the dignifying of the personnel executive which attends his elevation to professional rank; welcomes the promise of further research, of more thoroughgoing experimentation in the considerate application of human energies to machinery and to every other branch of production. Only if there is to be a new profession of personnel management it is essential that its province should be defined, that its ethics should be in harmony with the best spirit of the times.

The province of the personnel manager, as defined at the Rochester convention, is to administer the selection and discharge of employees, the development of sources of competent labor, the improvement of working conditions and the determination of equitable standards of output in relation to pay. While, of course, this conception involves the permeation of the entire factory organization by the human interest of the personnel executive, it means specifically that the employment manager is charged with responsibility for four problems,—selection, training, payment, discharge. Having assumed that this was their conceded jurisdiction, the employment managers at Rochester discovered with surprise and manifest anxiety that two other powerful forces were busily at work in what they had assumed to be their exclusive field.

The United States Department of Labor attended the convention in force. Secretary Wilson himself was there. And he and his subordinates were unanimously insistent that the day of "destructive labor recruiting" was done for. Competitive advertising and the "stealing" of labor, especially among government contractors, has been disrupting the national industrial army and sabotaging productive efficiency. The federal government is therefore rapidly extending its system of public employment offices through which the mobilization of

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labor to and among essential war industries is being centralized and accelerated. The Department of Labor can at this time do no more than urge the discontinuance of competitive advertising and "destructive recruiting"; but they are determined to stop it. And the time may soon come, as Secretary Wilson intimated, when the government will let no contract which does not specifically stipulate that workers must be recruited through public agencies only. This will, in the present maladjustment of labor supply to demand, mean the assumption by the government of one important function which the employment managers have considered exclusively their own. The government will undertake to develop and direct the labor supply, leaving only the task of selection to the personnel manager.

But even this truncated jurisdiction is being infringed. In Seattle, which is a union-shop city, and especially in the Seattle shipyards, the trade unions have established a prior right to select workers from among their own membership. And the official examiners of the federal employment service, who decide the qualifications of journeymen entitled to full journeymen's pay, are themselves selected subject to the joint approval of the unions and employers. This means that the whole problem of "rating," the decision as to the degree of skill possessed by the applicant, is settled by a third party representing the public interest. Furthermore, problems of grievance and discharge, of the proportion of men in training to craftsmen, are not left to the discretion of the employer or his personnel manager alone. They are subject to democratic decision. Finally the wage rate is set, not by the employer's fiat either directly or through the instrumentality of the employment manager, nor by the blind "law of supply and demand," but by negotiation under a collective agreement to which the government is party. This rule of joint decision in matters of selection, rating, and discharge, supervenes not only in Seattle but wherever there is a trade union organization strong enough to insist upon what has become the government's recognized labor policy. It supervenes, as one of the speakers at the Rochester Convention pointed out, in an increasing number of essential war industries.

Think what this means. It means that the personnel executive is no longer free in what he and his employer had claimed for his exclusive jurisdiction. He is no longer allowed to apply his technique, to follow unhampered his specialized science of labor manipulation. He may develop ever so exactly a method, let us say, for judging the special fitness of applicants for certain work. Yet if the trade union is strong enough, his scientific standard must bend to the more familiar standard of membership in a craft organization as the condition of giving and receiving employment. Arbitrary science must yield to democracy, the expert to the organized multitude.

The possibility of a profession of personnel management seems suddenly to dwindle and fade. Yet we are here confronting a situation exactly like that which has faced the devotees of the Taylor system of "scientific management" for more than ten years. Scientific managers and trade unions have until recently stood with locked horns, both claiming the banner of science in management, both refusing to be reconciled. But on both sides signs of a profound change in attitude are visible. Wise employers are beginning to recognize democratic psychology as an element essential to the definition of a scientific technique. The organized workers are giving steadily widening latitude to their professed approval of genuine science in management as distinguished from speeding up and rate-cutting bonuses inimical to the integrity of their democratic organizations.

May it not well be that this story of opposition withdrawn in pace with the extension of democratic control is about to be repeated in the wider field of the new profession of employment management? The time may be approaching when the personnel executive will be paid by both parties to industry; indeed, with the widening appreciation of the public's crucial interest in industrial efficiency which the war has so signally stressed, it is conceivable that the personnel executive will be paid by the three parties to industry,—the organized employers, the organized workers and the government. That is the drift under the National Industrial Councils in process of establishment in England today. Far from involving its paralysis, this new democratic status would bring a new security, and enhanced dignity to the new profession.

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Manufactured Science

THERE was never a time when accurate knowledge of the conditions of efficient production was of such vital consequence to the country as it is today. The war has necessitated the creation of vast new industries over night. Hundreds of thousands of workers have had to be trained to unaccustomed work of crucial importance in the face of a serious shortage of competent foremen and shop executives. The problem of efficient industrial mobilization has been further complicated by the necessity of drawing heavily upon the labor of women. The heads of the munitions producing sections of the government have been under a great burden of anxiety not only to get efficient work done at high speed but also to prevent the introduction of large numbers of women from demoralizing the family living standards of men and equally to prevent the inconsiderate exploitation of women. Men can be replaced; but the failure to surround women with adequate safeguards strikes at the foundation of family life and mortgages our national vitality. To mobilize the latent labor power of women and at the same time to keep the foundations of family life secure has been one of the most difficult problems with which the directors of munitions production have had to deal.

All this gives timely significance to the research activities of the National Industrial Conference Board and especially to this Board's recent report on the influence of hours of work upon the efficiency and health of women in industry.

The National Industrial Conference Board is a cooperative body, composed of representatives of national manufacturing associations—the American Cotton Manufacturers' Association, the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, the National Metal Trades Association, the National Association of Manufacturers and some thirteen others. No group of men in the country is in an equally advantageous position to command all the relevant facts relating to every detail of productive efficiency, from the effects of standards of hours, wages, shop sanitation and management upon the workers and the community to their effect upon profits and the financial security of essential industries. As representatives of the highest type of employers, it was to be assumed that they would maintain the most complete and efficient system of cost accounting and shop management, the most accurate system of supervision and record over the lives and working habits of their employees; that as leading citizens as well as leading employers they would be as deeply concerned with the public effects of work in their establishments as with the hard-headed, practical business man's interest in investment returns.

When such a group of men set out to give us a "scientific analysis of the established facts" relative to the effect of hours of work upon output and health of workers, especially women workers, it would seem fair to assume that they must be actuated by the highest motives of good citizenship, and in this time of national stress, by the most disinterested motives of patriotism.

This was the generous assumption with which I turned to the recent reports of the National Industrial Conference Board on strikes in American industry in wartime and hours of work as related to output and health of workers. I have a deep respect for the practical ability of great manufacturing producers, the scholar's respect for men of signal creative achievement. Probably it was for this reason that the astonishing paucity of facts, the crude distortion of such facts as these reports contain, the disingenuous evasions, special pleadings, mean, cynical and snarling prejudices, with which under the velvet screen of professed "science" these reports attempt to poison the minds of the laity, filled me with vicarious shame for the great manufacturers and good citizens who are made to stand sponsor for them. I am sure that they cannot know what follies their agents have been committing in their name. Their fault can be nothing more than the common fault of even the best of business men in assuming that the cheapest talent is good enough for institutions of learning and scientific research. The anonymous authors of these reports reveal all the mental characteristics of the shyster lawyer who picks up a precarious living in the police courts. They certainly are not the type of men whom great manufacturers would employ to counsel them on matters of major business strategy. One great financier, to my personal knowledge, a man who was deeply interested in the establishment of the research department of the National Industrial Conference Board, has withdrawn his financial support. He is a man who has been giving himself whole-heartedly to patriotic service during the war, and who felt that to support such venomous distortions of the truth would make him particeps criminis against the best interests of the nation.

I pass over the report on Strikes in American Industry in Wartime. Purporting to be a "scientific analysis of the established facts," it contains

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no facts whose interpretation in this report will withstand impartial examination; it does not so much as mention the services which the trade unions have rendered to the government—services so signal that collective bargaining has become the de facto Government policy. Under the cloak of spurious "science," it makes slanderous insinuations against the trade unions hardly worthy of a prosecuting attorney in an Arizona mining camp. The entire report is an insidious attempt to place responsibility for interruptions of war production primarily upon the trade unions regardless of the fact that the trade unions have been, next to the patriotic appeals of President Wilson, probably the greatest stabilizing influence in our war industries. How was it that the cantonments were built so silently and swiftly? How was it that our shipyards increased their working force from a few thousands to a quarter of a million of men with unprecedented freedom from strikes? The answer is that the government unfalteringly entered into collective understandings and agreements with the responsible trade union leaders.

But the trade unions can take care of themselves. When it comes to the women, however, the case stands differently. Most of them are newcomers into industry; they are largely unorganized; they are peculiarly susceptible to the perils to health and sustained productive efficiency incident to unguarded response to emotional appeals. The political organizations of women in certain of our suffrage states are still wavering on the question as to whether the safeguards which the wisdom of experience has placed about the hours of work, especially night work, of women should or should not be abrogated for the period of the war. They see in the war emergency an opportunity to clear away the old pre-judgments against women, rooted in the vague sentimentalism about their frailty. At the lower levels of skill, moreover, wages have not gone up in pace with the rising cost of living, and hundreds of thousands of women, in addition to the patriotic appeal of the country, are goaded on by the hunger appeal of their children. The country needs them; they must be employed. But there never was a time when the future security of the country's family life demanded such careful consideration of the particular work for which women are best fitted, demanded such conscientious establishment of safeguards to health or such scrupulous enforcement of these standards.

And now comes the National Industrial Conference Board with a "scientific analysis" of the effect of hours of work upon the output and health of workers, especially women workers. In the foreword, the report says: "Conclusions as to the proper length of the workday must take into account not only the effect on output and on health, but also the need of the worker for a reasonable period of leisure for recreation, home life and self-development." That sounds admirable. But beyond this general pronouncement of a high ideal, the report has nothing further to say. The cotton industry is generally centred in relatively small communities where the problem of checking the effects of factory work upon individual and community life is comparatively easy. But the report takes no account of the crucial question of infant mortality in the cotton manufacturing communities, of juvenile crime, of illiteracy, of the morbidity rate, of any of the criteria of a healthy community life. Is it possible that the great employers and good citizens who compose the National Industrial Conference Board are ignorant of or not interested in the importance of such matters? For many years, Fall River, Massachusetts, one of the country's largest cotton manufacturing centres, was notorious for its high infant death rate, for its unpuritanical record of juvenile delinquency.

Hidden in an appendix, the report prints a table from the U. S. Census Mortality Statistics, 1909, which shows that the death rate from tuberculosis among cotton mill operatives is higher than for all other occupations; that a larger percentage of them commit suicide, die of apoplexy and paralysis, of cancer, of diseases of the circulatory system, of cirrhosis of the liver and of unclassified and unknown causes than of any other group of mechanical employees. And in the face of such evidence, this "scientific analysis" announces the complacent conclusion that "the most significant fact brought out by these fragmentary data is that apparently there is no conclusive information as to the health hazards to which cotton mill operators are exposed."

If this is true, why is it true? Have these great manufacturers of the National Industrial Conference Board similarly inconclusive evidence as to the financial health of their investments? Is it less important to have conclusive information about the health of employees than about profits and loss?

The report is especially concerned with the effects of legislative and voluntary reduction of hours of work for women upon output and health. As a result of state legislation, "76% of the employees in the northern cotton mills covered by the investigation were working on schedules of 54 up to 55 hours per week, in nearly every case 54 hours"; in the South, thanks to the absence of restrictive legislation, "the prevailing work week in cotton mills is 60 hours." To ascertain the effect of reduced hours upon health and output is the central professed purpose of this "scientific analysis of established facts." But in the midst of confus-

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ing scraps of distorted and piece-meal "statistics," the anonymous authors suddenly discover that "the preponderance of evidence (showing that reduction in hours has resulted in a proportionate reduction in output) is so marked that extended analysis of the data is unnecessary."

What is the nature of this evidence? "One manufacturer stated." .... "One mill estimated." .... "The president of a northern spinning mill said." .... "The head of a spinning mill also found." .... "Broadly speaking, it may be said that the inquiry by schedule and correspondence indicated that practically no recorded data were in existence ". . . . . etc., etc. A "scientific analysis" by the largest associations of the largest cotton manufacturers of the country!

But the report does contain a table ingeniously placed so as to convey the impression that it does represent a "scientific analysis" of the experience of seventy establishments, and upon which the authors base a summary to the effect that there is "striking unanimity of opinion among cotton manufacturers that reduction of two or three hours to 54 or 55 per week in the cotton manufacturing industry has involved an approximately proportionate reduction in output. Substantially similar reports were made as to the effects of reductions from 58 to 56 per week."

Pencil in hand, one looks sharp at the table. On inspection one finds that it is based on the reports not of 70, but of 48 of the 109 northern establishments covered by the investigation, and that these 109 establishments employed only 48 per cent of the total number of workers in the northern mills as given by the U. S. Census of Manufactures for 1914. Upon further inspection of the data supporting the table one finds that in only 17, or at most 19, of these 48 establishments was the reduction in output actually proportionate to the reduction in hours.

In the case of one establishment—the authors of the report have a lazy fondness for individual cases upon which, however, they do not hesitate to base sweeping generalizations—in which "piece workers turned out practically the same amount of work under the 54-hour schedule as under the 56-hour schedule and that this substantially offset the loss in production by time workers . . . . further investigation developed that there had been a radical change in the management of this mill by which *modern methods* were introduced at the time hours were reduced." Further on in the report there is a shy intimation that "differences in the methods of operation and in efficiency of management may exert a much more important influence than differences in the number of hours of work." But throughout the report the implication is that to enforce modern methods of management upon the cotton manufacturers would be a grave injustice and a national calamity. Let hours for women alone; reduced hours necessitate improved methods of management and that requires fresh brains, modern methods, fresh investment. No further legislative reductions in the North; no legislative reductions in the South at all. Let tuberculosis flourish and women die prematurely. Of course "conclusions as to the proper length of workday must take into account not only the effect on output and on health, but also the need of the worker for a reasonable period of leisure for recreation, home life and self development." But that is a benevolent thought for Sabbath consolation, not a workday guide to hard-headed practical business men. Hands off the cotton industry at the nation's peril!

We have a right to expect something better than this from the distinguished men who compose the National Industrial Conference Board. Surely upon examination of what follies their agents have been committing in their name they will conclude that in honor and self-respect they themselves have a right to something better. Never before did the nation need authentic scientific knowledge about industrial standards and practices as it needs it today. The gentlemen of the National Industrial Conference Board could supply it if they consulted their own best instincts and the best interests of our democracy. Who that knows them, knows their power, intelligence, disinterested patriotism, doubts that they will?

ROBERT W. BRUÈRE

At Mr. Adams's

EVEN his undiscerning friends, if indeed he had any of that kind, saw Henry Adams as many-sided and would admit that he was baffling. For his more discerning friends his elusiveness made him a delightful riddle whom they were perpetually hoping and failing and hoping to read. He had both the "slight continual strangeness" which Aristotle liked in a good Greek play, and also a deeper strangeness, always felt and now and then coming out into sharp light. Mostly, however, the light was not sharp or perpendicular. It slanted and was pleasant, a civilized respecter of privacy. By its aid one saw Mr. Adams as plane beyond plane of reticence.

In Mr. Adams's later years he divided his time between Washington and the Continent. At Paris he was willing to move about for the sake of seeing people, to dine out in restaurants and even in other people's houses. When in Washington he never left his house on Lafayette Square except to take

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a walk. This house, built for him by his friend H. H. Richardson, was an odd home for such a fastidious man as Mr. Adams. The leather chairs which abounded were all so low that they seemed to have been made for the host's own use. Things which he had brought home from Europe and the East were everywhere, and though they were beautiful their total effect was not beauty but miscellaneousness. To the eye it was a very Bostonian house, though Mr. Adams did not care to have you think so.

Between him and his younger friends there was a good understanding. Half of it was explicit—they were to make free of his house, to bring anybody they pleased to luncheon, to give dinners there. By the terms of the other and tacit half they were to bring him, sooner or later, everybody in whose company he would find interest and pleasure. Fastidious all his life, at almost every contact with the world and with ideas, he was nowhere more fastidious than in choosing his acquaintance. And yet his friends seldom made a mistake about his taste. They knew that he could gather whomsoever he pleased about him, and that he wanted those only whom he found good company. Great names were nothing to his purpose. Neither large fortune, nor conspicuousness in political life, nor achievement in art or business could impose on him. He was a little gratified perhaps, perhaps his irony celebrated one of its minor triumphs, whenever one of the great ones upon earth fell short of the standards he tried a companion by, just as it tickled him to refuse, to college presidents who innocently assumed they could have it for the asking, a copy of the privately printed and still unpublished education of Henry Adams. His was a social school where you had to take honors in order to pass.

One or two malicious bystanders have maintained that fashion stood a better chance of getting inside Mr. Adams's door than riches or power or mere brains. Their malice may have been due to envy, for its implications were quite false. He did have about him, to be sure, and particularly in his later years, a few friends who were not remarkable for anything excepting that sophisticated form of agreeableness, that economy of "manners" and that ease of intercourse which Mr. Adams prized, and which are likely to flourish most in the kind of society which prizes such things. But the smartest people in the world, if their heredity and environment had not taught them how to be agreeable, discovered that their smartness could not keep Mr. Adams from blackballing them. And if women found pleasing him easier than men found it, his acuter women friends understood the reason: he took women ever so much less seriously.

So far were achievement and reputation from imposing on Mr. Adams, whether as credentials to his company or as anything else, that he seemed to undervalue them even in their relation to the rest of his undervalued world. Observers who might dispute this would not think of denying that he undervalued his own achievement. It was a great achievement. Most men, asked to account for the hours they had spent upon earth, would be glad if they could give such a solid answer as the eleven volumes of his History of the United States. And the History is not the only answer Mr. Adams could have made and would not. The volume on Chartres and Mont Saint Michel is the despair of writers who helplessly wish they could rival the clearness he gave his intricate learning and his independent thought. He was tireless in his effort to understand contemporary affairs with the last thoroughness, and his was a mind that knew how to grasp tight and to hold fast. Not caring to play a speaking part in politics, he gave liberally of his knowledge and his wisdom to such of his friends as did care and did play. What Mr. Hay owed to his informed advice is not yet disclosed to the world, and perhaps never will be. Specialists often turned up who found Mr. Adams a specialist in each of their fields. After an evening at Mr. Adams's a Japanese statesman declared him to be one of the four occidentals whose comprehension of the East and its problems was thorough. Many similar stories of him could be told, and all would sharpen the contrast between his inside, where a passion for learning and thoroughness held sway, and an outside that sometimes looked like a dilettante's.

The "instinct for workmanship" was strong in him, and his work was most of all to understand. Yet The Education of Henry Adams is a self-conscious record of his failures to do just this, especially of his failures to understand "what he valued most, . . . Motion" and "what attracted his mind, . . . Change." The words are his own, and in the perseverance with which he exaggerated his failure there was parti pris. Living in London through our civil war, an active-minded and keen-eyed young man, using all the opportunities for observation which his father's secretary could not lack, he noted with positive pleasure his inability to see into the motives of official England. Long after Charles Francis Adams had changed the official English attitude, by his famous sentence to Russell—"It would be superflous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war"—long after revealing documents had been published, Henry Adams delighted to give the most lucid reasons for believing that neither at the time nor later did he understand the proportion of sincerity to insincerity in Lord John's conduct. He would often add, perhaps in thought

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he always added, that nobody else, not one of the principal actors, understood any better than he. His was a reversal of the egotism which feeds on belief that one knows as much as those who know most. It was his habit to detect in other men an ignorance equal to that which he attributed to himself. Passages that illustrate this habit may be read on almost any page of The Education. He was not illuded. "He exaggerated these weaknesses as he grew older," he writes of himself. "The habit of doubt; of distrusting his own judgment and of totally rejecting the judgment of the world; the tendency to regard every question as open; the hesitation to act except as a choice of evils; the shirking of responsibility; the love of line, form, quality; the horror of ennui; the passion for companionship and the antipathy to society"—although Mr. Adams recognized all these as "well-known qualities of New England character in no way peculiar to individuals," he thought them as much his own as if they had been nobody else's.

In one respect he was quite wrong. No one as courageous as he could be a shirker of responsibility. He no more shirked it than he shirked the labor which made him a learned man and a "copious" writer. His education was a failure only because his standard was impossibly high. He knew men and cities and books, he had gone in imagination far up the stream of time, but he was dissatisfied because the ultimate knowledge that he exacted of himself he never attained. No one has attained it. For what Mr. Adams wished really to know was Motion, by which he meant the one force that keeps this world going, and Change, which cannot be understood, in the sense he gave to understanding, by any man to whom the future is unknown. What a pride was his, who counted his knowledge of past and present as nothing against his ignorance of what shall be!

The Education of Henry Adams, which will probably be published before long, is certain to take a high rank among sincere autobiographies. It is a book of the most singular and varied interest. Mr. Adams had a wide experience. The people he met and the events he lived among are seen and rendered as distinctly as possible, although he pretends to treat them as nothing but contributors, more or less useless, to his education. He uses his concentration upon himself as a means of painting a many-colored world. And it is a most amusing book. "The same failure marked the Society of a College," he says, writing of Harvard in the seventies. "Several of the best educated, most agreeable and personally the most sociable people in America united in Cambridge to make a social desert that would have starved a polar bear." One of The Education's marked peculiarities is that it undertakes both to study Henry Adams minutely, to examine his tribal traits and his unaccountable idiosyncracies, and at the same time to keep equally curious readers at a certain distance. In this last respect it does not quite succeed. One feels, after reading it, that one knows Mr. Adams not altogether well, perhaps, but better than he meant to be known. The unfair advantage one takes of him is to guess that he knew himself not quite so intimately as he supposed, that he would have judged the world differently if he had known how to analyze the judge.

From a Poilu

[The following is a letter from a French sergeant of infantry to a friend in France.]

HERE I am again in the routine of the old life. It was not too hard to take it up again and I am back in my habits of "poilu." Comfort is certainly lacking; they also neglect, in general, to blow the siren when the shells come on! But one gets accustomed to everything.

On my return, I found myself in America. Indeed, my company shared the hospitality of a grove with the American troops which were to relieve us. We spent a week together. If we had not left, I could easily have gathered material for a book. Unhappily my information was cut short, for I left my new friends the day they took over our lines.

You may say this to our American friends: it is impossible to conceive of a more complete understanding, of a deeper sympathy than exist between the poilus of the two groups. These feelings are expressed in a thousand ways: promptness in helping each other, exchange of small presents, and especially the eagerness to be together. I have often witnessed a scene such as the one I saw yesterday: Before the fire, two Americans are cooking dinner for their comrades in the lines; five or six French poilus are around; and they all chat, and laugh, and rough it with the greatest cordiality. The most interesting part of it is that they succeed in understanding each other. If the war lasts but a little longer they'll create a mongrel language of the most picturesque effect. The reason for this sudden friendship is easy to understand: it is founded on mutual respect.

By making use of all the English I know, I might succeed in making myself understood. I was quite struck by the fact that several times American soldiers asked me what we think of them. They are evidently anxious to know our opinion of them, and that it should be good. It is good. When they arrived, our poilu considered with a certain amount

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of caution these troops sumptuously, even elegantly equipped, generous with their dollars. One had to wait and see how they would act, under fire. One did see, and they were wonderful in their power of resistance, in their obstinacy, their seriousness. Surrounded by the Boches in a recent coup-de-main at B., they fought like mad men, with their fists, with their feet: the Boches could not take back one single one. Their patrols are models of the kind: coolness, fearlessness, ingenuity. Under the bombardments which they had to undergo, they did not flinch, and this should be sufficient to judge them. On the other hand, they do not have the false pride to believe that they have nothing to learn from us, quite the contrary, they ask questions at every opportunity; they gather information; they try to know more in order to do better. When I went to their camp, I was beset with questions, and it was clear that they took pleasure in the practical information which I could give them.

Last night I spent some time with the French sergeants who had been in the lines during the day and passed orders to the Americans. I thought of the pleasure which our friends would have had, had they heard our conversation. They were unanimous in their praise, and they all expressed such a real, warm sympathy towards our new allies that I cannot imagine a more beautiful tribute. I never experienced such a high degree of cordiality. The passing of the orders as told by a very animated Parisian must have been extremely amusing. The American officer could not speak a word of French, but one of his sergeants knew a few words of it. The French sergeant, of course, knew not a word of English. You may imagine how laborious the operation was. But our poilu is a clever mimic, and the two parties succeeded finally. During the day, they saw the earth being shovelled up in the distance: the Boches were working. What do you know! the American officer wanted to go and get them, in full daylight! Youth is a beautiful thing! He would not have gone ten steps before he would have been shot down!

Several American soldiers showed me pictures of their French comrades. The other night, around the bivouac fire which, owing to the heavy rain, we had been able to light (for in fair weather the avions don't allow any such thing), two young citizens from Alabama, after a quarter of an hour's conversation, made me read all their family letters, sweethearts' letters included.

It was quite touching to see them so moved; they were apparently in a more confiding mood with me, a chance comrade who could hardly speak their language, than with their own people, and they felt less embarrassed to make confidences. I am sure they spent two good hours with me, and they will tell their best girl about it. I must add that the letters I read resembled the letters our poilus receive like sisters; certain formulae of ours are a literal translation; they have the same reserve in the expression of their feelings, the same disregard for big words, and there is the same fine courage on the part of the women. After all, it is only natural, for the Boche alone has refused to drink the "milk of human kindness." But just the same, the resemblance between the letters struck me.

The American soldiers stationed here are very young. My grandfatherly appearance interests them. But when I told them that "territorials" forty-two and forty-five years old were in the lines, near them, they could hardly believe it. Don't the foreigners know that?

Their idea of discipline is bewildering to us. It would be difficult to explain to you all I have seen and heard in what it differs from ours. Here is a story. The other day, an American driver was going down a steep hill with four mules. The brake did not work, the animals bolted. Cleverly the man leads his team towards a wood. One of the mules knocks himself against a tree and falls. The whole thing stops. Calmly, the driver gets down, examines the mule, decides he cannot be saved. He then pulls out his revolver, kills the mule calmly and goes on his way.

I wish you could have seen the expression of the poilus who witnessed the incident! You would have laughed! They spoke about it several days and have not swallowed it quite yet. Imagine such a thing happening with us! How many inquiries and reports we would have had! How many responsible persons to be found! The Americans buried the mule without any more ado, and this evidently is the simpler method, the more so, that all the reports in the world would not have revived the mule.

The American discipline seems free from all the old fetters which hinder us. An officer gives an order, briefly: this order is carried out at once. With us, the order is carried out, too, but there is some grumbling first, and wondering if the order is very useful. This comes assuredly from our rebellious spirit, but there is a historical cause for it, too.

The exercise of a more "realistic" discipline would undoubtedly have brought similar results with us.

I have not been able to observe the relations between the American soldiers and their officers. I saw only a few officers in a little village near the lines. They were quartered in the house of a good Lorraine woman. They were very popular among the village people and had a reputation of being extremely courteous and generous. Indeed,

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they spoil prices. The most astonishing thing is that they don't have orderlies. We could never imagine it. It is the more astonishing because these officers are without doubt, gentlemen, and belong to a high social class—if one can use the word "class" speaking of America. My relief sergeant described to us last night the distribution of food to the company in reserve. Each man comes to the "roulante" (ambulant kitchen) with his plate, and stands in line. The officers do like the men; the last who arrives is served last, were he a captain. The menu is the same for all. I need not add a word to this simple fact: you are an old army man. As for me, I call this "admirable."

I am glad that the American troops have made their début in Lorraine. It is not a secret. The population of this region is indeed more open-hearted than anywhere on the front. The country people are very nice, and most kindly disposed towards the soldier. They welcome the American soldier like the French and the American seems to appreciate the attentions and kindnesses bestowed upon him.

The good woman who shelters me here told me that "*her*" Americans had written home and said they had found another "maman." There is another advantage: the Lorrainer does not exploit the poilu—except in rare cases. I met a few Sammies who complained of the high cost of living, and truly it is high, for everybody. But more than once I saw Americans, after a wineless lunch, install themselves on a caisson and drink a bottle of champagne. They thought it was expensive, because they had paid eighteen francs for it, and they could not see the difference between the four franc tisane which *we* order and their eighteen francs Moët.

They asked me many questions about the soldiers' pay. They could not believe that the poilu gets only five sous a day. Several told me they intended to stay over one or two years after the war, to learn French. I had mentioned my idea of starting a French class between duties. If I had not left, I think I should have had them all as pupils. In the letters I read I had noticed that they all spoke of learning French. I think these intentions ought to be encouraged. It would not prevent the Americans from fighting between times, and our relations with the U. S. would only gain by it.

All I learnt during my very short stay with our new allies proves that cordial relations, profitable to both parties, ought to be extremely easy to establish in the future. Will something be done in that line? It is not for a poor sergeant like me to start the question, but I call your attention to it. The question of languages is in my opinion of primary importance.

The other night, an American section received orders in German. One of our cadet officers and one of their sergeants could speak Boche. They had not been able to find any intermediary speaking both French and English.

Cannon—Whose Fault?

III—Designs

OF all the charges levelled against the Ordnance Department in the matter of cannon, the bitterest and the most persistent has to do with designs. People say:

"The Ordnance Department had the French guns right before it. They are the best guns in the world. Instead of just taking them, the Ordnance Department spent weeks and months trying to make American designs that would be improvements on the French designs. Then, after endless puttering and palavering, it had to go back to the French designs and begin from the beginning all over again. And there we were! Weeks and months simply wasted! And even then the Ordnance Department was not satisfied. Having at last made its choice of designs, and having put those designs into factories, into production, it kept changing them. And it still keeps changing them. It still keeps trying to improve them. It will not let them rest. It will not let them go through. The first great delay was in the choosing of designs, and the second great delay is in the incessant changing of designs; and what we need to do is to sweep these putterers and changers and improvers and theorists out of the Ordnance Department and put some practical men in their places. Then we would be all right."

I believe that this diagnosis is very misleading. I believe that it would take us on to the wrong remedy and divert us from the right remedy. The designers in the Ordnance Department have made their mistakes. But let us see just what they have done. Let us review the designs, the types, of our artillery in our present artillery programme.

The first type is the 75-millimeter field gun. It is the most controversial type and, in its history, the most calamitous.

Seventy-five millimeters are approximately three inches. When we went into the war we had a regular standard three-inch gun "of issue." But it was quite old. It was "Model of 1902." Its

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carriage, though in many ways excellent, was in many ways antiquated. And the carriage is the thing, the critical thing, the determining thing. We needed a modern three-inch carriage. And we were in course of making one.

This new three-inch carriage of ours was "Model of 1916." It was not an "improvement" on any French model. It had nothing to do with any French model. It was an entirely American model, already designed, already on its way through its tests.

The question, therefore, was:

"Shall we manufacture this 'Model of 1916' or shall we abandon it and manufacture the French 75-millimeter?"

The Ordnance Department designers decided in favor of the "Model of 1916." And I think that any other group of persons, in their places, at that time, would have made that same decision.

We assume today that it is easy to make French products. On the contrary, it is very difficult. French methods are entirely different from ours. French drawings are very hard for us to follow. I know a certain motor-car firm which tried, several years back, to make a certain French motor. And it was a very good firm. But it spent almost half a million dollars before it got twelve of those motors that would work. The trick was not in the drawings. The drawings were highly adequate. The trick was in the hands and fingers of French artisans. And French artisans were not present. These experiments are numerous in American industrial life. The copying of French designs is not an enterprise to be approached light-heartedly.

Further, the American "Model of 1916" had merits not at all possessed by the French 75-millimeter. The "elevation" of the American model—its power of lowering and raising the point of the gun, in firing—is forty degrees. The French "elevation" is only twenty degrees. And the "traverse" of the American model—its power of turning the point of the gun from side to side—is again forty degrees. The French "traverse" is only six degrees. This vastly superior "elevation," this vastly superior "traverse," are distinct military advantages, in the opinion of multitudes of experienced military men.

And, finally, the drawings for the "Model of 1916" were already in our hands; and we had put that model into a shop; and we had completed several experimental specimens of it; and these specimens were standing their tests very satisfactorily. If we sent for the French drawings it would take at least a month to get them, and at least two months more to translate them, as was proved afterwards in the case of other French drawings.

Which was the way to instant action, to speed?

The "Model of 1916" was adopted. And it was adopted from the beginning. We simply changed its calibre from three inches to seventy-five millimeters and went on with it, just as we had it.

So much for the American 75, for the moment. But we also adopted a British 75. It was being made for the British in this country, with a calibre delightfully original: namely, 3.03 inches. When the British order for it expired, we continued it in production for ourselves, with the calibre changed to 75 millimeters. This change in the calibre made it necessary for us to make a change in the firing-pin. Otherwise we left the British design exactly as we found it. There was no effort whatsoever at "improvement."

The next size in our programme is 4.7 inches. We had a 4.7-inch gun of our own, a standard American type. There was no question of any substitute French type. There was no attempt of any sort to take any French type of this general size and better it. We had a 4.7; and we kept on having a 4.7; and we now have a 4.7. And, with the minor changes that happen in the production of any war-commodity in any country, it is precisely the same 4.7 that we had when we entered the war.

The next size is the 6-inch gun and the 6-inch howitzer.

We had no 6-inch gun. We did not attempt to design a 6-inch gun. We adopted a French 6-inch gun at once. I say "at once." The higher authorities, way up above the Ordnance Department, in the region of the White House, had to decide, first of all, whether we were going to fight side by side with the English or side by side with the French. If with the English, then it might have been wise to take English guns, loadable with English ammunition. But it turned out to be with the French. And we at once adopted a French 6-inch gun—that is, a French 155-millimeter gun—called a Filloux. It was our first adoption of any gun in that class. It was our last adoption of any gun in that size. From first to last, without change, our 6-inch or 155-millimeter gun has been, and is, the Filloux.

Passing from the 6-inch gun and coming to the 6-inch howitzer, we must pause to note our national wealth in war-materials. Though we had no 6-inch gun, we did have a 6-inch howitzer. A howitzer is shorter than a gun and has less range but it lasts longer and, in certain sizes, is much valued. The 6-inch size is particularly important. Few types of artillery can be said to bulk larger, in actual warfare, than 6-inch howitzers. Our total number of 6-inch howitzers in our army,

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when we declared war against Germany, was *eight!*

We had two designs, of our own, for 6-inch howitzers. One was our regular standard design. It was quite considerably out-of-date. The other was a new design, in process. An order for experimental specimens had been placed. But no specimen had been produced. Therefore, we did not rely on it. At the same time when we adopted a French 155-millimeter gun, we also adopted a French 155-millimeter howitzer. It is called the Schneider.

We got the drawings for these French models —gun and howitzer—in July. We spent from July to September translating them. They had to be translated not only into American measurements but into American materials. Many French materials, in thicknesses, in sizes, are not available in America.

And the drawings were in themselves difficult. Like all the French drawings, they left much to the workman, the skilled workman, the mechanic-artist. Our American drawings must leave nothing to the workman. They have to be perfect. These French drawings had to be perfected for our purposes.

And they were a bit numerous. In the case of the howitzer, for instance, they numbered more than 300. That is, there were more than 300 sheets of them, some sheets containing one drawing and some sheets containing several drawings.

And our staff was small. It was difficult, enormously difficult, to get draughtsmen. In fact, it was almost impossible to get draughtsmen, in competent numbers. It became necessary to go to private employers and persuade them, out of patriotism, to *lend* draughtsmen to the Ordnance Department.

But, above all, our supervising force, our technical directing force, our force of men genuinely acquainted with guns and gun-carriages and with drawings for guns and gun-carriages, was simply appallingly and disgracefully and hopelessly inadequate. In the Gun Division, the total number of experienced ordnance officers was *three*. In the Gun-Carriage Division it was *five*. All other experienced ordnance officers were needed in other divisions, such as Small Arms.

The brains containing the whole of our technical directing knowledge about guns and gun-carriages throughout the whole of last summer, selecting types, scrutinizing old types, studying new types, getting drawings, supervising the translations of drawings, seeing manufacturers, telling manufacturers and telling new reserve officers just what sorts of manufacturing would be necessary, hunting factories, hunting draughtsmen, hunting engineers, spreading themselves out over everything, starting everything—those brains, those officers, were *eight!*

When we think of what they did, when we think of how they labored throughout those first terrible months, bringing this country from nothing to something in cannon, I say that all we can do is to take off our hats to them and thank God they were there and be very humble in their presence.

They selected the French 155-millimeter Filloux gun and the French 155-millimeter Schneider howitzer, and they made no effort whatsoever to supplant them with American types, and they proceeded onward.

The next regular size is 9.5 inches or 240 millimeters. But on the way to it they found two irregular sizes, irregular from our standpoint, already being manufactured in America: namely, the British 8-inch howitzer at Midvale and the British 9.2-inch howitzer at Bethlehem. We have ordered both of these howitzers continued for us and we have ordered them continued on purely British lines. We have not attempted to Americanize them at all.

In the 9.5-inch or 240-millimeter size we had no model of our own. Our largest "mobile" gun was 6 inches. Above 6 inches, in "mobile" artillery, we were perfectly innocent. But we were working at a 9.5-inch design, on paper. It was a French design. Midvale had brought it from France, before we went into the war. We continued to work at it and we adopted it. It became our first and only 240-millimeter model.

And that was the end of our list of types in our programme for "mobile" artillery. We had chosen two American types, three British types (relatively unimportant in quantity), and three French types.

And so we went on to our "sea-coast" programme. This programme consists of taking certain "sea-coast" cannon, which were already in existence, and of equipping them with field-carriages or with railway-mounts for use in France.

On July 29th General Pershing cabled for certain "sea-coast" cannon in the calibres 5-inch and 6-inch. We designed field carriages for them, we put those field-carriages into production, and we began shipping them from their factories on December 3rd. They were American, wholly. There was no change from French to American or from American to French.

The larger "sea-coast" cannon, the 8-inch ones, the 10-inch ones, the 12-inch ones, will be operated on railroad tracks, and they have to have railway-mounts. Some of these mounts are American in design. Some are French. Those that began with being American are still American. Those that began with being French are still French.

In the "sea-coast" artillery programme, just as in the "mobile" artillery programme, the idea that there has been a constant shifting and a mixing,

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backward and forwards, between one design and another, from pure French (for instance) to Americanized French and then from Americanized French back again to pure French, is altogether false.

We have made shop-changes, certainly, innumerable shop-changes, in the details of our designs, while under manufacture. I shall speak of them later. But our designs themselves, our types, when once chosen, have remained chosen, so far as I can find out, from last spring and summer to date—except in one instance.

Our American 75-millimeter carriage, when it failed as a quantity-output carriage in our factories, was removed from first place in our 75-millimeter schedule. It continued in production, but it ceased to have first place. The French 75-millimeter carriage was brought in to supplement it and to outrank it. Our largest manufacturer of 75-millimeter carriages was shifted from the American model to the French model.

There is much to be said about that change. But it was our only change in fundamental design. And it was a necessary change. And it has gone by. And the shop-changes, the changes in detail, are beginning to go by, too.

These shop-changes were at one time far too numerous—far too numerous, that is, for maximum speed in manufacturing. They formed the principal topic of conversation in the mouths of manufacturers working for the Ordnance Department. But in February of this year the Ordnance Department, in this particular, began to reform itself.

It passed a rule to the following effect: that never again would it order a change "unless it is necessary in order to avoid interferences, to prevent breakage or other failure, or because of some equally important defect. *Changes of designs solely for the purpose of improving them will not be made to apply to material under production.*"

Following this rule there has been a marvelous abatement in changes. A certain section of the Engineering Bureau of the Ordnance Department once produced, in a certain month, 115 changes in the material production under its care. In the last month of record it produced only 15. We may confidently say that the detail-change-habit in the Ordnance Department is coming under strict control.

But I go back to the American 75-millimeter carriage. It met defeat. It was a splendid carriage, and it remains a splendid carriage, as a unit. And we were able to make it, as a unit. But when we tried to make it by the hundred and by the thousand, we were stopped. As a quantity-output thing, it met defeat—disastrous defeat.

We say now that the Ordnance Department ought to have foreseen that defeat. But what could it foresee it with? To foresee a quantity-output defeat, it needed a quantity-output eye, a quantity-output experience. And it had never been permitted to have any such experience.

The question is not: why did it fail to *foresee?* The question is: why did it fail to *see?* The "Model of 1916" was meeting defeat for months. Why did the Ordnance Department fail to reinforce it, fail to supplement it, till February?

That is not a question in design. That is a question in production, in business organization, for the Ordnance Department and for Washington. And we shall see, I think, that the genuine delays, the delays that are humanly curable, lie in that direction.

WILLIAM HARD

The League of Nations

THERE is a theory abroad that our stock of mental energy is a fixed and limited quantity: if a people is at war, it cannot at the same time use its mind in construction. That is an unhistorical delusion, when one reflects on the work of the French Revolution in thinking out, amid civil and foreign war, the ideas which furnished European progress for a hundred years to come. Whatever be our reason, we in England are not yet thinking with our whole national mind about international organization, and the other belligerents are doing even less than we. The result may one day be a little disconcerting. One cannot get one's thinking done vicariously. Neutrals cannot think for belligerents, nor Englishmen for continentals, nor Americans for either. There is a risk that when our scheme of a League of Nations is produced, if it is the exclusive product of the American and British minds, it may provoke a rather sudden reaction in the breasts of continental peoples, whose outlook on these questions cannot be the same as ours. In two essential particulars the attitude of continental peoples towards this problem of the enforcement of peace must differ fundamentally from that of Americans and Englishmen. In the first place the risk of invasion colors their whole attitude to war, while it looms before us only as a dim possibility. In the second place both the United States and the British Empire are satisfied Powers, which experience no such imperious needs of change in the world as drove most of the European states into this war. Here are two basic differences, and unless we can become violently conscious of them, our effort to think for a continent will be about as successful as the efforts of the rich to think for the poor. Nothing in these differences will, I think, impair the simple workmanlike conception of

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a pledge to submit all differences to conciliation or arbitration, but the whole problem of the enforcement of decisions, and the material organization of the League and its sanctions, can hardly wear the same aspect from the American, British and from the continental standpoints.

Let us consider first the vital question of security and risk. We in England and you in America can, on the whole, afford without exposing our national life to the direct danger, to gamble on the success of the League, and even to pledge ourselves in every event to join in coercive measures against a disloyal Power. We shall both stake life and wealth, and that is for a Power which has lived hitherto in isolation a splendidly generous offer, but neither of us will stake what every continental people must face—the chance of invasion and devastation. This factor in calculation will work in two ways. First, the continental critic must scrutinize the mechanism of the League very closely, to ascertain whether at the best it really promises an increase of security. Secondly, he will ask whether at the worst the obligation to join in coercive measures does not involve a fresh increase of risk. Under the first head he will fasten at once (as the British League of Nations Society has done) on a big gap in the defensive armor of the American scheme. It proposes to coerce member states which break their pledge to give peaceful conference a trial before going to war, but it provides no means whatever for dealing with an outsider or seceder, who refuses to avail himself of the League's procedure. This omission may detract fatally from the value of the League to continental states. "Of what use," France will say, "is your League to me, if Germany does not join it? You will coerce me, if I want to go to war without conference, but you will leave her free to do as she pleases." Bulgaria and Serbia, Italy and Austria, all the fatal pairs of enemy states, will say the same thing.

A Power which wants to be aggressive need only stay outside the League, or step outside it, to enjoy perfect immunity. To my mind it is essential to make the League a society for defense not merely against the lesser danger from within, but also against the greater danger from without. If this is not done, then if any dangerous Power does remain outside the League, partial alliances will inevitably be formed against him, and these alliances, because they will be the real bases of security, will govern the world, and distract the League and overshadow it. The answer may be, perhaps, that one should not expect that any Power will stand aside. But what if a Power secedes? The other point is equally serious. Will continental states all agree to give an absolutely unlimited pledge to fall "forthwith" upon any aggressor, whoever he may be? Suppose that he is my ally (if alliances survive) or my late ally. No British Foreign Secretary could persuade this nation to join a German army in invading France for many a long year to come, if she were the offender. The jingoes and the pacifists would unite to oppose him, whatever the League might say. Nor can one see Austria joining Italy to coerce Germany.

The case is worse for the small states. Are Holland and Denmark going to promise forthwith to declare war on Germany if she offends, or Sweden and Rumania on Russia? The risks are too unequal, and the League's forces might lumber up very slowly to succor these little peoples, whose geographical situation would make them its sacrificial vanguard. It would be possible, of course, to comprise the League only of great Powers, but in that case it would soon come to wear a dictatorial aspect, and it would miss the balancing votes of the smaller neutrals in its councils.

If there is a way out of these difficulties, it may be found perhaps, at once in a more elastic pledge and in a rather closer organization. The pledge to partake in measures of coercion must surely admit of degrees of cooperation and of reservations. An ally, for example (if defensive alliances survive as one fears they may) may hesitate to promise in all cases to attack his partner, but he ought to agree to give a disloyal partner no aid if that partner goes to war without conference, or even, I would add, if that partner becomes involved in war by reason of his failure to give effect to an award or recommendation of the League's court or council. In that way the law-abiding Power would always be able to call on its friends for succor, while the lawless Power would always be isolated. As Europe is organized today, this sanction alone would be almost enough for the League. Small states may agree not to help the aggressor, but hardly to attack him. Japan and the South American states can hardly be expected to send all their forces to a European theatre of war. These considerations point to a modification of the pledge, so that states may subscribe to it subject to the specific undertakings which they shall give on their adherence. The corollary of this elasticity would be that the League must evolve some kind of active council, be it only a permanent conference of ambassadors, which will watch events, and muster forces as dangers arise. We cannot trust to an automatic *levée en masse* of all the world. The problem is rather to have a reliable contribution of forces, positive and negative, in readiness for each emergency.

The further point on which the inevitable bias of American and British thought may mislead us in our constructions concerns the enforcement of recommendations or awards. Both societies lay stress on the prevention of war, but both of them touch very delicately on the means of removing intolerable situations which make for war. Let me say at once that I think any pledge to enforce the recommendations of the council of conciliation would destroy the League at the very start. The individualist tradition of the sovereign state is too violently against it. The Council, moreover, would become, if this consequence followed its deliberations, an overburdened dictation to the earth. But, none the less, there lies behind our readiness to accept this serious limitation, some failure to perceive that the status quo is sometimes for some nations intolerable, and that change is as necessary to life as security.

If dissatisfied states have no reasonable hope of securing change by the mechanism of the League, they will sooner or later go to war to obtain it. What is much worse, they will arm and group themselves in preparation for war, and we shall never evolve beyond the old armed peace. The dilemma is serious. If we promise to enforce awards, we may never constitute our League. If we renounce all intention of enforcing awards, then the dissatisfied, growing, proletarian and parvenu states will seek their real life outside the League, in combinations which offer them some prospect of securing change. The solution may lie in a middle course—that without promising to enforce recom-

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mendations, the member states shall, when any Power hesitates to give effect to a recommendation, agree that they will "meet at once to consider what steps, if any, the situation requires." The case may not be grave enough for any action; its merits may be obscure, or the aggrieved Power may also be the stronger Power, well able to secure justice for himself. It may suffice to apply an economic boycott, or to make sure that no ally will help the defaulting Power. Some pacific action will often be desirable and in the last resort military coercion may in rare cases be necessary. Once more we face the conclusion that the League will hardly be workable unless it evolves some permanent though elastic Council which can fill the place of an executive.

The matter of sanctions is so difficult and military sanctions will affect the divers members of the League in such delicate ways, that it is clearly wise to cast about for substitutes or alternatives. The economic boycott is not exactly an alternative, for without force to back it, no strong Power will submit to it. If the League were for example to declare that British merchant ships were excluded from its ports, I suspect we should send our warships instead. If the League boycotted Germany on land, her armies would soon be over the border. There is, however, a possible way of recruiting the League and holding it together which proceeds by a contrary method. It is probably necessary to prepare both methods, but of this we may be sure, that the more we lay stress on the coercive penal aspects of the League, the less will it evoke the spontaneous loyalty of nations. The ideal course would be to bring all to think of it primarily as an association which conferred on them great and evident advantages. They must join it because these advantages are indispensable. They must act loyally within it because the withdrawal of those advantages would be ruinous. If then we can devise such advantages, we have an alternative sanction to force. Disloyal conduct would involve ipso facto expulsion and the forfeiture of the League's benefits. Apart from security (a boon which states do not value equally) these concrete benefits must clearly be economic. The Entente has devised something of the kind in its Paris programme, but it has made it exclusive, and divorced it from any constructive policy of peace. No statesman, be he British or neutral, who himself desires a League of Peace, can for one moment imagine that it could exist in an atmosphere of boycotts and trade wars.

It seems to follow that the Powers, when they enter the League, must exchange at least negative assurances against the pursuit of the "war after war." The saner half of British opinion, as Lord Lansdowne's letter states, has long been moving in this direction. The first vindictive enthusiasm for the Paris policy has spent itself by its emotional excess. The liberal press is more united and outspoken against it than at first. (May I say here that I was entirely mistaken in a former article in some fears which I had based on an article in the Daily News? It adheres steadily to its traditional policy of free trade.) There is then some hope that some vestiges of commercial freedom may survive the war. If we may hope for this, why should we hesitate to go further? May it not be feasible to draft some rudimentary charter of commercial freedom, which might actually be one of the bases of the League? The New York Reform Club drew up some excellent suggestions, but it did not propose to make them a part of the League's organization. Suppose that agreement could be reached on some few points such as these four: (1) Members of the League to accord most favored nation treatment to each other in their home markets. (2) No member to discriminate in favor of the trade of his own merchants in his non-self-governing colonial dependencies. (3) The "open door" for capital by international arrangement in such areas as China. (4) Provision by an international commission against monopoly in raw materials.

If this seems a big and speculative programme, let us ask ourselves whether the four contraries to these principles could be made consistent with the maintenance of any League of Nations—tariff wars, closed colonies, the struggle for exclusive spheres of interest in China, the effort to throttle rival trade by holding up raw materials from export. If we must save ourselves from these abuses, may we not in the act give to the League a new stability and attraction? Ground it on such a charter of commercial freedom as this, and no industrial state could afford to remain outside it or to step outside it. The power to declare that a state had, by disloyal and aggressive conduct, forfeited its claim to membership and the privileges of membership, would be the most potent of all possible sanctions. The boycott is too sudden and too provocative to be an ideal sanction. The advantage over it of a charter of positive benefits is that it would act as a continual cement to the League, creating a mutual interdependence of interests so close that the League would figure in the daily life of every trading people as a persuasive benefactor. Against passion and ambition, it may be, the coercive military sanction would still require to be held in reserve. But let us beware of desiring a League which will be as arid and forbidding as the criminal law itself.

H. N. Brailsford

CORRESPONDENCE

Prussian Schools

SIR: After reading Professor Judd's article on Prussia and Our Schools one wonders how many more of our institutions will be found to have been tainted with the Prussian virus. Until lately several generations of students of American educational history had labored under the impression that the American school system had grown up by the addition of new classes to those already in existence and that the high schools were the people's colleges. Even Horace Mann in the report on Prussian schools to which Professor Judd refers was under this impression. "Massachusetts," he writes, "has the honor of establishing the first system of free schools in the world; and she has projected a plan so elastic and expansive, in regard to the courses of studies and thoroughness of instruction, that it may be enlarged and perfected to meet any new wants of her citizens to the end of time."

It is unfortunate that Professor Judd should have attempted to support his view that the public school is Prussian in organization and spirit by reference to the reports that appeared about 1840. This period in the history of the Prussian elementary school was the most

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liberal; Pestalozzian influence was at its height; the teachers were receiving a breadth of education and training that they have never regained; and the school curriculum was then in process of expansion. "No one," writes Mann, "who witnesses that quiet noiseless development of mind which is now going forward in Prussia, through the agency of its educational institutions, can hesitate to predict that the time is not far distant when the people will assert their right to a participation in their own government." The reaction against the schools and teachers only began in 1844 under Eichhorn and culminated under Von Raumer in 1854. The characteristics that Professor Judd attempts to impute to the Prussian elementary schools date from that time and the law of 1872. Far from being limited to the three R's, Horace Mann reports that he saw instruction in the elementary schools in speaking, writing, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, surveying, trigonometry, bookkeeping, civil history (ancient and modern), natural philosophy, botany and zoology, mineralogy, knowledge of man, world and society, Bible history and Bible knowledge—an array of subjects only equaled by the academy, which was almost as selective as the gymnasium.

Professor Judd's memory fails him when he attributes either to the Prussian schools or to the reports of Stowe and Mann great influence on the American schools. Both Mann and Stowe are careful to warn their readers against the assumption that the Prussian school system could be adopted in this country. Stowe reminds his readers that "in considering the modifications in the Prussian system necessary to adapt it to this country, we remark in general, that among us, more must be left to popular action, to the free choice of a community, and less attempted in the way of positive legislative enactment." In fact neither Stowe nor Mann was interested in the topic of organization and administration; classification in schools is only referred to incidentally. Their chief interest was in the training and supply of teachers, the curriculum and methods of instruction and corporal punishment. As to the Prussian school organization, attendance between 1825 and 1862 was required from the fifth year of age and continued until pupils could satisfy inspectors or pastors as to their attainments. The schools were organized not in grades but in sections—lower, middle and upper. Even at the present day eight classes are found only in some 680 schools out of a total of nearly 39,000. In any case it could hardly have been the influence of Prussian schools that determined the organization of Massachusetts elementary schools in nine grades.

No useful purpose is served in misrepresenting facts to bolster up a theory. The reorganization of American schools that Professor Judd has in mind has so many other arguments in its favor that it does not need an anti-German bias to support it. Such an interpretation of history may recoil on those who employ it. It is conceivable that some future historian may charge Professor Judd with having borrowed the plan for his proposed reorganization of the American school system from the movement that has been revived in Prussia since 1914 in favor of the establishment of the Einheitsschule.

I. L. KANDEL

New York City.

[Mr. Kandel says that Horace Mann was not interested in organization and administration and that classification in schools is referred to by him only incidentally. At the beginning of a strong section of his seventh annual report Mann says: "The first element of superiority in a Prussian school, and one whose influence extends throughout the whole subsequent course of instruction, consists in the proper classification of scholars." This is followed by a full comparison with our unhappy condition because we lacked classification.

Mr. Kandel doubts the influence of Stowe's report. It was printed at the order of the Ohio General Assembly (1837), and a copy was sent to every school district in the state. "In addition, the report was republished and extensively circulated by the legislatures of Michigan, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia and Pennsylvania." It is full of detailed description and laudation of the Prussian Volksschule.

Mr. Kandel tries to leave the impression that the typical organization of Prussian schools was not and is not an eight-class organization. He suppresses the facts which must have been before his eye when he states that even today eight classes are found in only 680 schools out of a total of 39,000.

The plain facts are that in 1912 33,559 out of 38,684 Prussian common schools were rural, corresponding roughly to our small one—or two-teacher schools; that, while 677 schools, including 10,431 classes, had the full equipment of eight years, 2,809 schools, including 35,560 classes, had seven grades and 1,484 schools, including 12,638 classes had six grades. The deficiency in the last mentioned groups indicates merely the lack of the final element or elements in a system which holds eight years as its ideal. The interesting point about an eight-year system is that it is explained by the fact that it aims to prepare children who come to school at six years of age for confirmation into the church at fourteen. The essence of the matter is the confirmation at fourteen which ends education. This does not seem to be at home in America.

Mr. Kandel seems to think that I said the Prussian curriculum was limited to the three R's. It was the American programme which I described in these terms. I did say that the Prussian course is meagre, rudimentary, vernacular and limited. Does Mr. Kandel think for one moment that any one believes that the Prussian common school taught trigonometry, surveying, mineralogy, and the rest? Since the earliest times the Prussian overlord has tickled the ears of the peasants with such high-sounding but empty names.

Any one interested in getting the full facts should read the scholarly and well informed book recently published by Macmillan from the pen of Professor Alexander with the title, The Prussian Elementary Schools. He will find there confirmation of all that I have said about the history, character and present condition of the Volksschule.

Finally, I do not note that Mr. Kandel shows the slightest appreciation of the fundamental teaching of my paper. Prussia has a divided school system. We have been struggling toward something new, an undivided system. Our elementary school, which took form in the days when men were writing—as even Mr. Kandel points out—about the Prussian schools, needs to be changed from an organization and a course of study which are too like those of the Volksschule into a truly American institution of a type wholly unlike anything in Germany.

Full evidence in support of my statements can be found in a bulletin prepared by Mr. Bunker and published as No. 8 of the 1916 series by the United States Bureau of Education.

CHARLES H. JUDD

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Women Doctors

SIR: May I draw your attention to a war condition which is not receiving the attention it should, though it is one of the highest importance, and moreover one which cannot be met at a moment's notice, but requires a tedious preparation. I refer to the probable shortage of physicians in this country. The Allies have suffered severely and continue to suffer for their lack of medical foresight. Shall we follow in their footsteps?

Already the hospitals are suffering from a shortage of internes, and except in New York City the number of students entering medical colleges has greatly decreased. By the end of the year one and a half million men will be in France and these will require 15,000 medical officers. Several drafts will be made this year and a large number of physicians will be called on to care for them.

Physicians will also be required for civilian work, which includes of course the care of the families of the fighting men.

In Europe at the present time there are ten hospitals completely staffed by women. Recently a call came to this country from France for a hospital entirely staffed by women. Almost simultaneously a similar call was received from Serbia. Both projects have been sanctioned by the Red Cross. Dr. Franklin Martin, chairman of the General Medical Board of the Council of National Defense, says that over 33 per cent of the practising women physicians of the country have registered for war service, and that women doctors will be called upon for the military hospitals in France if the emergency becomes so great that it will be impossible to get men physicians.

Woman, especially the college trained woman, has now an unusual opportunity for rendering her country a valuable patriotic service. She should enter a first class medical college this fall and begin her studies so she may be ready to render service when called upon.

Medicine offers a scope for the energies and talents of the trained woman, and at the same time gratifies her instincts of sympathy and protective care as few other occupations can do.

Even if the training of physicians were not in such urgent demand as a war measure, the profession of medicine grows increasingly attractive and remunerative to women besides presenting unusual opportunities for the practice of humanitarianism as well as for achievement and reward.

A fund is being established for the purpose of aiding capable women who desire to enter the field of medicine. In the meantime, every capable young woman able to serve her country in this particular way should immediately begin making the necessary arrangements.

MAUDE GLASGOW, M.D.

Other Messiahs

SIR: Professor Dewey's warm defense of Mr. Alexander's thesis makes the entirely sound point that the reviewer should have presented a more detailed analysis of that thesis. I agree that "if the book is worth reviewing, the thesis is worth stating." But even if I had presented this same analysis which Professor Dewey gives in the first paragraph of his letter of protest, I cannot see that my criticism would have been essentially different. I made straight for what I consider the significant points, the perception of which Professor Dewey accuses me of having exhibited ingenuity in evading. These were, whether Mr. Alexander's philosophy is essential to his technique, and whether his philosophy is relevant to the world situation. I may entirely misunderstand Professor Dewey's logic, but he seems to intimate that the success of the technique proves the philosophical thesis:—If Mr. Alexander cures the neuroses of civilized men which express themselves in intellectual and moral maladies, his theory of conscious control and guidance as the next step in human evolution is thereby proved. This logic would prove the truth of Christian Science or of any other thesis of the cofunctioning of body and mind.

Professor Dewey says that Mr. Alexander's principle is "experimental," but there is no evidence in the book that this "education which will integrate the functions now so disastrously divided" has been worked out by experimentation, or that Mr. Alexander has ever made the slightest step in the use of his physiological technique towards experimental establishment of his simple and sweeping claims. If his technique has not been worked out experimentally, then I do not see the unfairness in calling it intuitive, for by intuition we ordinarily mean just that gift of knowledge or skill which a person possesses independent of scientific procedure. The technique is empirically established by its success in concrete cases. The thesis and the philosophy behind it remain brilliant guesses, just as interesting and provocative as the theories of Dr. Jung or any of the other workers in this field. Mr. Alexander's tone seems to be such as to make the plausibility of his theories rather less than more convincing. He has all the air of a man with a message. He is announcing truth, not presenting plausible scientific hypotheses. It was this tone which caused my scepticism. To imply, as I did, that his philosophy outranges his technique, is not at all to imply that he is either self-deluded or a deliberate faker. It is simply to point out that he seems more concerned about being accepted as a philosopher than as an extraordinarily gifted physiological manipulator. Why this should seem to Professor Dewey to be so insulting I am at a loss to see. I cannot agree with him that the choice before civilization is limited to "reliance upon some scheme of magic" and the task of putting Mr. Alexander's method into universal operation. I suspect that there are other Messiahs and other evangels, with which Mr. Alexander's method may profitably cooperate. The reader who fears being misled by my review had better buy the book and satisfy himself as to the validity of Mr. Alexander's intellectual operations and the cosmic persuasiveness of his thesis.

R. B.

Unmarried College Girls

SIR: I have just finished reading in your issue of April 20th an article on Feminine Achievement: and note that the statistics of college women show that only 39 per cent of them marry, the inference drawn being that college education lessens either the desire or the desirability of women for marriage. I think you have got the cart before the horse. Eighteen is the age at which most girls enter college, and at eighteen most girls know whether the chief end and aim of their existence is the admiration of the other sex. If it is they don't as a rule go to college unless firmly impelled by parent or guardian.

Only 39 per cent of college girls marry, not because education has that effect but because the girl who elects to take a college course, puts the things the college stands for before the attentions of the male sex. Those same girls who elected to go to college—given congenial work—would have shown the same percentage of marriage had they never gone to college.

A READER

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Republican France

SIR: Your article on France and the League of Nations, which I had the honor of translating, has been reprinted with comments by French papers of the most varying shades of opinion. As is natural, each one claimed you for his own. I am sending you a clipping from the Journal des Débats, and another from L'Humanité, reprinting my translation of your article with a few introductory words by Renaudel. You may be interested to read the enclosed clipping from L'Action Française, the monarchist paper for which Léon Daudet acts as "barker" and Charles Maurras as sociologist.

Charles Maurras takes in good part your wish for a France which should be "the policeman and continental soldier of the maritime powers," and with your assertion that the means to bring this must be given her. This interpretation is not false, but it is one-sided. The royalist publicist sees the body of your argument, but not its soul, for while you believe that we must win and consolidate victory, you also want this victory to be democratic and for the good of the whole world.

Your Emerson, in a lecture at the Old South Church in Boston, forty years ago, on March 30th, 1878, remarked that the art of war, after substituting firearms for bows and arrows, seemed to have gone to sleep in a sort of routine. It had stopped, he said, at Roger Bacon's or the Monk Schwartz's gunpowder, the arquebuse and its derivatives. "As if the earth, water, gases, lightning and caloric had not a million energies, the discovery of any one of which could change the art of war again, and put an end to war by the exterminating forces man can apply."

Will the pacifist wish implied in these last words be granted? Will this war put an end to war? It would be visionary to predict it, but we must desire it.

Emerson goes on to say that the number of combatants or the number of dead does not give a war its moral importance. "No interest now attaches to the wars of York and Lancaster, to the wars of German, French and Spanish emperors, which were only dynastic wars, but to those in which a principle was involved." For there are wars which continue to arouse the same passionate interest. They are those of conscience, "when the cannon is aimed by ideas, when men with religious convictions are behind it, when men die for what they live for . . . When the cannon articulates its explosions with the voice of a man, and the women make the cartridges . . . and the better code of laws at last records the victory."

Emerson does not overlook the difficulties peculiar to democracy, its perversions—Tammany already existed—the reefs ahead, but for all that he does not lose his faith in it. His political religion really foreshadows that of your admirable President Wilson. He formulates it thus: "The new conditions of mankind in America are really favorable to progress, the removal of absurd and antique irregularities . . . The humblest is daily challenged to give his opinion on practical questions, and while civil and social freedom exists, nonsense even has a favorable effect. Cant is good to provoke common sense. The Catholic Church . . . the rebel paradoxes exasperate the common sense . . . The lodging of power in the people, as in republican forms, has the effect of holding things closer to common sense; for a court or an aristocracy, which must always be a small minority, can more easily run into follies than a republic which has too many observers—each with a vote in his hand—to allow its head to be turned by any kind of nonsense: since hunger, thirst, cold, the cries of children and debt, are always holding the matter hard to the essential duties."

In quoting these passages I seem to see L'Action Française laughing, scornfully (Charles Maurras) or sneeringly (Léon Daudet). "Tant pis pour qui rira," as Molière's Alceste says. If anyone had a right to smile it would be you, when Maurras, the monitor of our Catholic and monarchist reaction, eagerly expresses his hope for a "*realistic* evolution" of American thought, meaning of course a *sceptical* one, on your part or President Wilson's toward the League of Nations.

You are not one of those "absurd men who never change," you accept with docility the lessons of facts, but your human and democratic faith remains whole, you have not ceased and cannot cease to believe—I borrow one last quotation from Emerson's lecture—that "we are in these days settling for ourselves and our descendants questions which, as they shall be determined in one way or the other, will make the peace and prosperity or calamity of next ages." You remain faithful—you who are so independent, who innovate so practically—to the spirit of Emerson and Wilson, the spirit of the best America in her tradition and her evolution: "No inquisition, no kings, no nobles, no dominant church." You still think that your country, where in spite of her faults—and every people has its own—"the government is acquainted with the opinions of all classes, knows the leading men in the middle class, knows the leaders of the humblest class, the President coming near enough to these," is not on the wrong track. France likewise, a good soldier of the League of Nations, can for you be only a democratic, republican and humane France. In fact you think that one can lay too much stress on the most legitimate national ambitions by making light of those international plans the success of which is most necessary to the life of the world, without realizing that "either must eventually prove fruitless if the other fail."

R. PÉRIÉ.

Nyons, (Drôme), France.

A Model Rejection Letter for Editors

SIR: A recent speculation in your page of Books and Things recalled a Model Letter for Editors sent me by a friend who had sickened of sugary comments. In war time, when so many men's bodies go back quite directly and naturally into mother earth without the officious interference of strangers hired to retard, the undertaker's fee begins to look like our one greatest offering to the famished ghosts of unhealthy superstition. Even so may the professional word of sympathy for the rejected cease to appease, and aspirant authors crave strong direct language. Why should editors beat around the bush? Here is my friend's model:

Dear Sir:
Your junk makes us sick. We hope never to hear or see any more of it. It's all off. This means you.
Sincerely,

Of course this would gain no subscribers.

MAXWELL ANDERSON.

Whittier, California.

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After the Play

The Theatre Slump

OFTEN during a rare and recent visit to London I found myself recalling the chuckled reply of Mr. Bourchier many years before, when after a chat in his dressing-room I asked if I could go round and occupy a stall. "Take a row of stalls," he said. "A row of stalls" is precisely what I have been occupying in my theatre rounds. No wonder that plays are falling all around us like autumn leaves. And yet only a few weeks ago managements were competing exorbitantly for the sole available theatre.

What is the cause of this sudden slump? Primarily, of course, the German offensive, and especially the initial German success. The theatre has been throughout the most sensitive barometer of our war fortunes. The battle of the box office has been lost or won on the fields of Flanders or France. But the present unprecedented depression is not the mere reflection of a mental mood. A more material factor is at work — the stopping of leave. London has been full of young men from the front anxious to pluck their hour of life, or fêted by their friends. These pathetic pleasure-pilgrims and their womenkind have constituted the staple theatre audience and nourished the daily matinées when all the rest of the world was at work. Here lay, indeed, the basis of the recent boom. With the vanishing of this cheery multitude, the clientèle of the playwright is dangerously depleted. The wounded, being frequently (and properly enough) the guests of the theatre, do not make its outlook less blue.

A second direct consequence of the situation, the Man Power bill, came to perturb myriads of families with grave uncertainties conducive neither to the theatre mood nor the theatre outlay, while the millions with members already at the front have been thrown into enhanced anxiety or actual mourning. There is only a limited number of fish for the theatrical net, and the fishers are numerous. The air raids have added four other adverse factors. They have darkened the streets, frightened people off them, changed and confused the hours of performance, and driven many prosperous people to live out of London, while the restriction of trains has diminished the daily inflow from the country. The Curfew has added to the chaos and by cutting off supper parties, already shorn of their dietary delights, has dimmed the joy of the jaunt. Moreover, the dearth of taxis and the superabundance of taxes (both theatrical and general) have increased the discomfort and extravagance of the outing. The large class with small fixed incomes has long been driven from the theatre as from all other luxuries.

Nor has the front been the sole source of depression. Ireland and almost every part of the empire have contributed their quota. And as if this was not enough, to this unparalleled coincidence of adverse conditions, has been added an appalling April, whose deluges have been dusked by the glooms of November. Conscription has already robbed the stage of some of its male idols — we were already approaching an inverted Elizabethan theatre with women playing the men's parts — but in view of its latest menacings, a famous actor-manager was perhaps not far from the mark when he asked a friend: "Will there be a theatre at all?"

"*Should* there be a theatre at all?" is however the form in which other people have asked the question. And, indeed, there seems a contradiction between the tense life-and-death struggle of our country and these mimickings and masqueradings, a sort of Nero-fiddling while Rome is burning. But the truth is that never was the theatre so necessary.

Whatever be the case against light entertainments, there can be no doubt that a serious work of art imparts a noble exaltation, so that I have always been shocked by the idea that good churchmen may not see plays in Lent, and I have wondered whether poetry, music and pictures are equally tabooed. Such works of art are, however, so rarely seen on the English stage that the churchman may be forgiven his prejudice. But even the more frivolous forms of entertainment, provided, of course, they are fun and not filth, have their legitimate place in the stress of war. As our nervous system is fashioned, it cannot remain strung up to one monotonous pitch of tragedy without danger of snapping. Lord Byron, when his mother died, betook himself to boxing.

Even if the mind kept itself resolutely fixed in the high tragic mood which seems its proper atmosphere today, the paradox of our psychology is that we should not continue to feel that mood. Just so, we become unconscious of a sound or a scent which is always about us. Consciousness can only really exist under change. Those wise old church festivals — the Feast of Fools and the Feast of the Ass — allowed even the most sacred ceremonies to be burlesqued because that only enhanced the real reverence for them. And on the same principle we shall become more vividly conscious of the high duty of the day, if we do not perpetually brood over it. The lighter theatres, therefore, not only help to keep us sane, but help to keep us serious.

That immortal cry of our infantry, "Early doors, sixpence," shows how the theatre has bitten into the popular life, and our rulers have rightly promoted entertainments for our soldiers. But it is on the nerves of the civilians that the national endurance ultimately depends, and it is a question whether instead of almost shutting up the theatres by its exactions and restrictions, the state should not actually subsidize them. Were this a short war, it might be possible to live throughout at a sublime and Spartan level, but with its indefinite continuance — and Europe has had its Thirty Years', nay its Hundred Years' War — we must needs adjust our many-faceted life to the new martial environment, as birds manage to sing between their uneasy glances for an enemy. Whether any of these facets, such as horse racing, can be eliminated without national loss, is a question that can be determined only by the special factors of the case, and not by any general principle that entertainment in war-time is an evil. It is, on the contrary, a national necessity.

For my part, having always sought in our "rag-time" period to lead the thoughts of playgoers to the problems of War and Religion, and the grave coming events which were casting their shadows before, my pen has felt no impulse, once the shadows had fallen, except to lighten the gloom. The Rabbi Borak, according to the Talmud, met the Prophet Elijah in the market place, and asked him who of all the motley crowd had the strongest claim on Paradise. The prophet pointed to an improbable figure, and explained: "Whenever that man sees a grief-stricken person, he seeks to cheer him."

And so, perhaps, when one's fellow-men are enduring unprecedented strain and sorrow, a writer or actor may well feel privileged if he can amuse them into momentary forgetfulness.

ISRAEL ZANGWILL

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Books and Things

A SERIES of eight satirical articles, contributed by "Lucian" to the London Nation in the last three months of last year, has been republished as a small book (London: Headley Brothers, 2 shillings) with 1920 as its title. The book will offend some of the stupidest readers in the world. Those whom it amuses and stimulates will not be its least intelligent readers. These statements are obvious enough. What is not obvious, but merely interesting to guess at, is the opinion of readers who are both offended and also not the stupidest. Will 1920 help to win the war? No, I can't at all imagine its doing that directly. Will it discourage military effort, reduce military speed, draw in here and there a military horn or two? I don't see how it can have any of these effects, though I expect such an accusation to be brought against it. Not yet have I come across anybody who admits that anything, even the worst of bad news, can weaken his own resolve to keep Germany from getting a military decision in her favor. Nobody seems to be afraid of anything that can be done to his own will by mere words or mere ideas. All he is uneasy about is their effect on somebody else.

But when one has asked whether a satire will help or obstruct victory over Germany, one has not quite exhausted the questions it may conceivably raise. Lucian's satire is nominally turned against excesses of the militaristic spirit in England. If one is convinced either that such excesses cannot possibly be found in any country except Germany, or that it is the duty of all of us to ignore and keep silent about them when found, then one will probably conclude that a book like 1920 ought not to have been published. But today I happen to be talking to those readers only who still have open minds, who still believe that the militaristic spirit may be found in excess, here and there, even among ourselves, and may do grave harm to our cause. I should not think of inviting any other sort of reader to consider the case of 1920.

Although a writer may have the satiric temper and the satiric hand he cannot put his gifts to use until he has invented his point of departure. If good points of departure were not such uncommon things, good satires would be commoner. Lucian may very likely have got the idea of this book by asking himself a question: "Suppose certain militaristic tendencies which I now perceive in England are allowed to go unchecked, unpruned, unclipped. What will have happened to the English point of view by 1920?" The answer is in the discoveries made by Charteris, upon his return to England after two years as a missionary in the interior of China. He finds that the will of England, so far as it may be ascertained from the acts and words of the statesmen and officials who govern her, has changed. It is no longer a will to win the war, no longer a will to keep the future free from any war by winning this one. It is a will to keep this war going for the sake of keeping it going.

Outside Morley's Hotel, on the morning after his arrival in London, Charteris sees a procession of old men and women, "some marching upright and alert, others bowed, depressed and slouching, as if bent on some unwilling errand which yet they were unable to refuse." Charteris is bewildered. An old friend, whom he happens to meet, one Priestley, explains things. A few months ago there had been a food panic. Everybody fell to shouting, "Stop food-waste and save the war." Food must be "reserved for those who were helping to win the war." Should the children be sacrificed? For a time their lives were in danger, but far-sighted critics had pointed out "the overwhelming case in favor of a long duration for the war and the necessity of universal military service afterwards. To starve our children now would be bad military economy, for they would be wanted as cannon-food later on." The solution of the problems was in such processions as this that Charteris was looking at — the fortnightly march of drafted men and women above sixty-five first to a dedicatory service in Westminster Abbey, and then to the Supreme Sacrifice. They were to be killed. The food they would have eaten would be saved. Charteris is horrified to learn that the Supreme Sacrifice is compulsory. Priestley tells him that voluntary service has been tried and "proved a complete fiasco." All persons above sixty-five, including Conscientious Objectors to the Supreme Sacrifice, are now examined by tribunals consisting of men of military age.

Differences of opinion as to the probable length of the war had divided men into two schools. Take reprisals, for example. All men agreed that reprisals were inevitable and useful. But there was a conflict between "those who based their calculations upon a further five or ten years' war" and who "urged that preferential treatment in the killing should be given to boys who were actually ripening into airmen," and those who "gave a longer duration to the war" and "insisted that the main effort should be directed against the future mothers of the race." Discussion of the Military Service (Females) Act, which made motherhood compulsory, drew attention to the same difference of opinion. Charteris innocently conjectures that the birth of a lot of boys would be accounted a good thing, and that "the business of your Mendelians" would be "to encourage the maximum proportion of males." Another friend, a clergyman named Martin, enlightens him: "Yes, that is just the assumption that the novice in this thorny controversy naturally makes. If you are arranging for a comparatively short war, say not longer than twenty or thirty years, of course the more boys today the more soldiers eighteen years hence. But, if you are guided by a wider military caution, you will take a longer range for the duration of this war, perhaps even keeping an eye upon the next war, and the next but one." So the satirist proceeds, one of his most telling inventions being the Psychological Laboratory for the Preparation of War Truth.

1920 is written by a hand that is sometimes heavy, sometimes light, mostly neither. It is a vigorous book, searching, clever, rigorous in its logic, hard, rather ill-natured. Is its purpose to remind men that when they fight the Fiend

> Half serpent in the struggle grow these worms,

and to ask us to distinguish between necessary growth in this direction and unnecessary? Put into words, its purpose might be something like that, yet the most general impression the book leaves upon me is that Lucian's eyes see clearly what is happening now to England, and that his imagination refuses to see what would happen if Germany won the war. His "total reaction" to the war is thin. This is the test, I dare say, by which many of us decide, in the roughtest possible fashion, for or against a war book—is the author's response to the war a thing of richness and imagination and pity and terror? The nature of his response is for many of us just now more important than a man's opinions. When I try 1920 by this test I side against it, finding in it a partisan's logic, a narrow spirit.

P. L.

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Memoirs of an Average Man

Face to Face with Kaiserism, by James W. Gerard. New York: Doran Co. $2.00 net.

TO the conventional European mind there is something dreadfully shocking in the frank publication of the observations of a diplomat not yet deceased. Mr. Gerard was well aware of the shuddering sensibilities he would tweak when he decided to publish his Four Years in Germany, and his Face to Face with Kaiserism, in some respects a continuation of the earlier book. But the old style diplomacy produced the war. This appears to Mr. Gerard, and to Americans generally, as a sufficient ground for disregarding its proprieties, when this is necessary, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the enemy.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Gerard's writings do very materially help the average American to an understanding of Germany. Our former ambassador represented us in more senses than one. He took with him to Germany a full equipment of the preconceptions and the limitations of the average American. He is a democrat, in spite of very definite ideas as to the distinction between people who count and those who do not. His knowledge of the country to which he was accredited was such as any Cook tourist might have acquired; his capacity to use the German language left much to be desired. How alien he was to the complexities of European thought on war and peace he betrays unconsciously in his enthusiasm over a literary discovery he made in Paris on his way back to America.

"Mr. Fabre-Luce, Vice-President of the Credit Lyonnais, told us of an interesting book, written by a Russian, and published before the war, which predicted much that has happened in this war with almost the foresight of a Cassandra. I was so impressed that I secured a copy." This book was The Future of War, by Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch. Mr. Gerard read the book with great edification, and quotes some passages, which, in his opinion, give a "better prediction of this war than the often quoted Bernhardi."

Does this not prove Mr. Gerard's typical Americanism? Here is a book published twenty-five years ago, which every diplomat, every staff officer, every financier, every scholar in Europe has read, or at least discussed; a book which inaugurated the recent peace movement and brought about The Hague peace conferences. Mr. Gerard just happened to discover it, after four years in Germany, and found it good. So might anyone of us have done. And anyone of us might have seen in Germany about the same things that Mr. Gerard saw, and might have arrived at about the same conclusions. Rather valid conclusions, too, if sometimes naïve.

It is the king business that has made of Germany the most desperate menace to civilization. Such is Mr. Gerard's conclusion, in a nutshell. The German people, as a whole, do not seem to Mr. Gerard a very bad lot. He asserts a great admiration for Bethmann-Hollweg, and finds many liberal and broad-minded men in the merchant class. The workingmen of Germany are brutal, but "this is because of the low wages they receive, and because they feel the weight of the caste system." "The German workingmen, both in wages and living, are on a lower scale than those of other western nations, with the possible exception of Russia, Italy and the Balkan States." This happens not to be true, to be sure; German wages before the war were the highest on the European continent. They were low enough, as every one knows, to excuse much in working class behavior; and the fact that Mr. Gerard advances the excuse distinguished him as a broader type of American than those who are endeavoring to establish the German brute as a permanent and unvarying type.

But whether the German people are brutal or not has little bearing upon the international situation so long as the country remains under the absolute sway of the Hohenzollerns. The Kaiser's ambition, Mr. Gerard argues cogently, was the force that brought about this war. As Mr. Gerard pictures the Kaiser, the world has to deal not with the absurd megalomaniac of the formal anti-German propaganda, but with an extraordinarily clever and resourceful man, who admits that "from childhood I have been influenced by five men, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Theodoric II, Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Each of these dreamed a dream of world empire. They failed. I have dreamed a dream of German world empire and my mailed fist shall succeed." And the worst of it is, the Kaiser is not a rare outcrop in an otherwise quiescent stock. The Crown Prince, also a talented and energetic man, or any other of the Kaiser's sons, might be as dangerous. The only solution Mr. Gerard sees for the European war problems lies in the restriction of the constitutional powers of the Emperor. With a German democracy the world can live at peace. And while Mr. Gerard does not insist that the war must go on until the Hohenzollerns abdicate, or accept a nominal sovereignty in place of their present practically absolute powers, he does urge as forcibly as he can that the outcome of the war must be such as to break the prestige of the autocracy. Even the German people will hardly remain long in their present subjection if they have in the end nothing to show for their sufferings but defeat. Mr. Gerard recognizes that the greatest danger to the future peace of the world lies in the possibility of eastern annexations to Germany. The only peace that can endure is one that grants the autocracy nothing at all upon which it can base a claim that it has increased the patrimony of the fatherland.

Mr. Gerard's essential purpose is political. But he has greatly enlivened his pages by copious observations on German life that have no direct bearing on his propaganda. In his discussion of the Aims of the Autocracy, for example, he introduces a capital sketch of the home life of a typical Junker family. It is dreary. Everything in Germany seems to Mr. Gerard rather dreary. The Germans have really no amusements. "It is characteristic of Germany and shows how void of amusement the life of an average citizen is and how the country is divided into castes, that there is no so-called society or personal news in the columns of the daily newspaper. You never see in a German newspaper accounts common even to our small town newspapers, of how Mrs. Snooks gave a tea or how Mrs. Jones, of Toledo, is visiting Mrs. Judge Bascom for Thanksgiving." The rare amusement loving German will have to wait for the translation of this book before he can learn that Mr. Gerard brought horses with him to Berlin, or that he rented an estate where he might shoot, or who is the husband of Mr. Gerard's wife's sister.

Mr. Gerard is disturbed over Kaiserism in America. He sees danger in the German newspaper, and grave danger in the text-books used in German classes. These books depict the more decent behavior of German rulers, he complains, and so impress the child-mind with admiration for royalty. We even have text-books containing Die Wacht am Rhein, music and all.

"I should like to be present at the trial in the secret court in Germany of a schoolmaster who dared to teach

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his pupils to sing the Star Spangled Banner or the Battle Hymn of the Republic." No doubt he would be shot. But after all, must we settle the matter of German in the schools according to real or imaginary precedents drawn from Germany? What are we fighting for, anyway, if not to put an end to the dangerous extreme of exclusive nationalism manifested in German policy?

Mr. Gerard's political conclusions, whether they relate to a foreign country or to America, lie on the surface. It has never occurred to him that there might be instances in which the resources of the expert might be called into his service. He advances complacently with his argument, recording his opinions on everything that presents itself with the pleasant grace of the average American. Where his experience is not more extensive than that of the average American, his deductions fall in well with those of the majority. And this lends credence to the deductions he draws from experience not accessible to the average American who has not happened to be ambassador at Berlin. Some readers of Mr. Gerard's books find disappointment in their meagreness of thinking. But profounder books would not so easily command general attention. And the vogue of Mr. Gerard is all to the good. He may leave the ultimate problems of war and peace pretty much in the dark, and yet it can hardly be denied that his influence makes on the whole for a broader and saner Americanism.

A. J.

The Lecturer at Large

The Soul of Democracy, by Edward Howard Griggs. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.25.

WE have in America a vast public aware and convinced that the intellectual heritage of civilization is worthy of analysis. It knows that Plato and Goethe, Browning and Shakespeare and Emerson, stand for great achievement that repays the understanding. It is anxious to know why Nietzsche is out of fashion. It has a concerned feeling that philosophy has a message of importance and science some bearing upon religion. It is in a critical epoch of transition. Its old cultural watchwords have proved unsatisfactory. Theodore Parker and Channing are beginning to be dim memories; Mrs. Eddy is but a foible; Dr. Jowett is leaving New York. It feels that this is a big world and it is finely eager for orientation. It sees the confusion of politics with dismay. It stands aside from the technical controversies of science and religion. It is vaguely disturbed by Mr. Wells, and distressed by the relentless analyses of Mr. Bernard Shaw. It sees its gods called everywhere into question; and the things it was once unrespectable to whisper it uneasily hears proclaimed from the housetops. It cries aloud for spiritual medicine to soothe its disturbed restlessness. It is anxious for a definite pronouncement upon the drift of things. The universities are remote from its life. The professors are uselessly technical or incredibly arid. The newspapers are concerned with other things. The mantle of interpreter has descended upon the popular lecturer who cultivates the suburbs of America.

Mr. Edward Howard Griggs is one of the best known popular lecturers in the United States. He seems to perform two functions. He lectures upon the permanent influences of culture—the Greeks, Shakespeare, Milton, Whitman, Plato. Sometimes an odd meteor—Tagore, Nietzsche, Masefield—flashes across the sky; then he too is gathered to Mr. Griggs' generous programme. He is the midwife of the multitude and he knows no limit to the birth-rate. In six well-compacted lectures he can tell the truth upon any subject from Omaha to Ottawa. He knows just what Plato intended by the metaphor of the cave. Sometimes people have wondered why Ruskin broke stones or Rossetti wore long hair; and Mr. Griggs can teach them respect for manual labor and a realization of how closely poetry and the artistic lock are intertwined. He stands for rectitude of taste in æsthetic matters. Nor is his attitude illiberal. He sympathizes with the tendency to a larger outlook for women. He is against the narrow conventions of middle-class morality. He is convinced of the need for a religion which, free from the constrictions of theological dogma, shall express the aspirations of man towards a deeper spiritual life. He is something of a prophet. He believes in progress. He admires the aspirations of the multitude. He likes the simple pathos of a great career like Abraham Lincoln, or Mark Twain, or J. J. Hill. He speaks a simple, eloquent language in which simple ideas, buttressed by the right quotations, are feelingly expressed. His gesture is vivid. His eyes have that far-away look of the man who sees visions between meal-times. He travels so often upon the same circuit that the ladies' clubs get to know him, and the thrill of old acquaintance renewed succeeds the announcement of his coming. He is the spirit of culture abroad in a land too tired to take its culture in other than tabloid form.

And across that land the shadow of war has fallen. In countless homes they are asking what it means. They hear that this is a war of ideas. They are told that ethics must be made applicable to international relations. It is proudly whispered that America has a special mission among the nations. There is a puzzling thing called reconstruction. Something has happened to socialism and feminism and education. Paternalism is preached as a gospel. The foundations of democracy are called into question. There is a terrible dearth of moral leadership. Democracy, it is said, must pass through the fire and only sacrifice can test and prove its purity. The air is thick with cries and nostrums and on the lecture circuits they demand instruction upon their meaning. In six lectures Mr. Griggs could do that superbly. "But," says he, "Go to! I will do more. I will write a book of twenty-two chapters each dealing with one of these topics so that the average man shall, in one hundred and fifty pages, be given a clue to this chaos." You take the lectures; and then the book permanently preserves for you the soul of democracy, embalms it lovingly, with every artifice of conventional gesticulation that the occasion so transparently demands. Mr. Griggs deserves the gratitude of every student of social psychology for the index he has provided to the minds to which he ministers.

Adequately to be appreciated, this book must be read as a whole. No extracts can reveal its encyclopaedic range, its fine simplicity, its profound faith in the great spiritual truths of history. Its primary insistence is upon the importance of character in life—character as we see it in Henry Ford or manufactured by the experiments of the National Cash Register Company. It contrasts the irritating surveillance of Germany with the freedom, instructive and tenacious, of the Anglo-Saxon; the case against prohibition, with the awful experience of the eleven o'clock closing rule in Boston thrown in as an extra (p. 13). France has fought with splendid courage and unity (p. 16); Russia must learn (p. 17) the difference between liberty and license; the moral law, like the physical, is (p. 19) "a fundamental pull in the nature of matter"; ethics does

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not play an adequate part in the relationship of peoples (chap. V); America has not (p. 35) been scrupulously fair to the American Indian; the greatest arrogance and selfishness today are to be found (p. 37) among certain labor leaders; a federation of nations (p. 42) will come slowly; it is well (p. 57) to carry a gun and know how to shoot; the Atlantic Ocean is only a mill-pond (p. 64); the next half-century (p. 72) will be an age of noble literature; the popular evangelists' hell (p. 74) is "singularly attractive"; men and women (p. 88) will work together for democracy; despite John Fiske (p. 93) we do not yet realize what representative government means; the only safeguard of democracy (p. 105) is "to keep the good people awake and at the task all the time"; we are endangered (p. 109) by the negative selfishness of indifference; the path of democracy (p. 121) is long and troubled but not hopeless; is it to be God or Mammon (p. 123); in a text-book of American history (p. 133) women were mentioned only on four pages out of five hundred; some college professors are human (p. 137).

I do not know what impression Mr. Griggs's book makes upon himself; I can only suggest what impression it ought to make. It is one of the most ignorantly superficial analyses that even this war has produced. It is full of gilded commonplaces and tawdry rhetoric. It wears a confident air of pretentious certitude that is as ignorant as it is distressing. It preaches those cheap nostrums of the market-place which are uttered either because the speaker is lazy or because he is timid. It never ventures upon originality. It never steps for one moment into a phrase, a thought, a gesture that might disturb the reader into thinking that all is not for the best in a doubtfully best of all possible worlds. It accepts the cheap philosophy of the advertising agent whose habit, in Charles Churchill's apt phrase, is "to mouth a sentence as a cur doth mouth a bone." It betrays nowhere any of the dirt and sweat of thought. It has the easy elegance of a man accustomed to the fluency of public speaking and certain, from experience, that one phrase will suggest another. Mr. Griggs speaks eloquently about the great work at Chautauqua and the university extension movement. If this is a fair specimen of its output, it can act only as an intellectual soporific. It is simply an insult that a man with any perception should think that sentences such as this book contains should be worthy of the permanence of printed form.

Mr. Griggs is old enough and experienced enough to understand that his position as a lecturer to great public audiences gives him a very serious responsibility. He is confronting men and women who ask for membership in the world of thought. They are tormented by its possibilities and eager to grasp at them. If this is the manner in which their demand is satisfied they are, in plain phrase, neither more nor less than betrayed. Mr. Griggs speaks of the great work done by Fiske. But Fiske did great work simply because he tried earnestly and soberly to get to the heart of the matter, because he did not burke his difficulties, nor hide the complexity of thought in tripping phrases. Truth cannot be taken by the hair and dragged to the public view. An harassed preacher, driven from pillar to post by the innumerable labors of a parish charge, might be pardoned for writing such a piece as this book for a Sunday sermon to a congregation that he knew would sleep it through. But Mr. Griggs is not harassed; his congregation does not sleep; and it pays for admission to the reading. In the result one can only hope that it will be long before he is guilty of such an unpardonable piece of commonplace persiflage. H. J. L.

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English Folk Songs in America

English Folk Songs from the Southern Appalachians. Collected by Olive Dame Campbell and Cecil J. Sharp. With an Introduction and Notes. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. $3.50.

THIS is confessedly less than half a review. A full review of English Folk Songs from the Southern Appalachians should deal extensively with the musical side of the collection; it should discuss the "gapped" scale in which nearly all these Appalachian tunes are cast and comment upon the history of some of the three hundred and twenty-three tunes given. But the present reviewer is not competent to do any of these things. Therefore, as gracefully as he can manage it, he will proceed to ignore the major part of the collection — the musical part — and deal with the songs and ballads, and with the very interesting culture in which songs, ballads and tunes have been preserved.

The people of the mountainous districts that include parts of the states of North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Alabama and Georgia, seem to be perfectly homogeneous and to have a character, a tradition and a culture of their own. Such a community in Europe would be making a claim for self-determination. Indeed, in Europe, the Appalachian districts, comprising as they do an area larger than England, Scotland and Wales combined, and with a population, excluding city dwellers, of three millions, would make quite a large and populous national group — such a state in the southeast of Europe would be making a bid for the hegemony of the Balkans,

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for the control of Constantinople or for a share of Austria. The inhabitants are regarded as the direct descendants of the original settlers who migrated from northern England between one and two centuries ago, and have since been so completely cut off from all communication with the outside world that they are still speaking the language and singing the traditional songs of eighteenth-century England.

They have lived a closed life poetically. The original stock they brought over (it must have included a few Irish songs, by the way; the use of the word "colleen" in Lady Isabel and the Elf Knight and the presence of the well known Irish ballad Willie Reilly suggests this) has not been overlaid by any novel creations. Realism — that is the approach to the familiar environment of the American mountaineers — has come through variants of these old English and Scottish songs. "What have you eaten, Lord Randal, my son?" the mother asks in our best known version of the ballad. "Eels and eel-broth . . . Mother, make my bed soon, for I am sick at the heart, and I fain would lie doun." "It's what did you eat for breakfast, Jimmy Randal, my son . . . It's cold pie and cold coffee. Mother, make my bed soon, for I'm sick at the heart and I want to lie down." "Eels and eel-broth" in the original was arcane for poison.

Variants now and again must have satisfied the craving for personal expression—

When your heart was mine, true love,
  And your head lay on my breast,
You could make me believe by the falling of your arm
  That the sun rose up in the West.

There's many a girl that can go all round about
  And hear the small birds sing,
And many a girl that stays at home alone,
  And rocks the cradle and spins.

There's many a star shall jangle in the West,
  There's many a leaf below,
There's many a damn that will light upon the man
  For treating a poor girl so.

Here the theme is known and the mould is made and it is by the varying of a simile here and there that these half personal verses have come into being.

A garden gone back to the wild — that is the impression that the poetry of English Folk songs from the Southern Appalachians makes upon a reader. Here are real flowers, although the stock is running into lowly forms:

O turn your back to the billowy waves,
  Your face to the leaves of the tree,
For it ill beseems an outlandish knight
  Should view a stark lady.

This may be a too familiar flower, but it is a flower, and as such is intrinsically different from the paper blooms that are our drawing room songs of today.

Mr. Sharp makes an interesting contrast between these traditional songs and the Cowboy ballads from Texas which Professor Lomax has recently published. "The cowboy has been despoiled of his inheritance of traditional song; he has nothing behind him," Mr. Sharp writes. "When, therefore, he feels the need of self-expression, having no inherited fund of poetic literature upon which to draw, no imaginative world into which to escape, he has only himself and his daily occupation to sing about, and that in a self-centred, self-conscious way, e. g., 'The Cowboy's life is a dreadful life;' 'I'm a poor lonesome Cowboy;' 'I'm a lonely bull-whacker,' and so forth. Now this, of course, is precisely what the folk-singer never does. When he sings his aim is to forget himself and everything that reminds him of his everyday life; and so it is that he has come to create an imaginary world of his own and to people it with characters quite as wonderful, in their way, as the elfish creations of Spenser."

What he says in his important introduction about the cultural significance of tradition should be pondered on by all who have any direction of the education of this country. He believes that culture comes from inheritance and not from education. This is a fact that modern educationalists are trained to disregard. Mr. Sharp notes that some of the larger cities in the United States are too ready to ignore the educational and cultural value of the national heritage which every immigrant brings with him to his new home and to rest too confidently upon their educational system, which is often almost wholly utilitarian and vocational, to create the ideal American citizen. Mr. Sharp's is possibly a voice in the wilderness. But it is worth while to take note of his words, "I admit that the problem which faces the educationist in America is a peculiarly difficult one, but it will, I am convinced, never be satisfactorily solved until the education given to every foreign colonist is directly based upon, and closely related to, his or her national inheritance of culture."

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Recent Publications

My Empress, by Marfa Mouchanov. New York: John Lane Co. $2.50.

IF the ex-Tsarina ever plotted in behalf of her German relatives there is no suspicion of it in this book by her first maid in waiting. According to Mme. Mouchanov, Alexandra never mixed in politics; and she insists that her mistress was a gentle, lonely, misunderstood woman whose only defect was that she lacked knowledge of the world and humanity. With the admission of this not really trivial shortcoming, Mme. Mouchanov involuntarily explains both the empress and herself. The book is testimony to the medieval, divine-right darkness in which the Romanovs and their retinue fumbled around. That darkness was thickest of course at the imperial centre. "What will the nation say, what will the nation say!" cried Alexandra and burst into loud hysterics when her second child proved another daughter. She dragged herself to weary state balls convinced that she would lose the love of her people unless they were occasionally allowed to behold their empress. When a regiment cheered her she felt reassured about popular devotion—not realizing what her maid-in-waiting has the acumen to point out, that regiments cheer to order.

But Mme. Mouchanov, though she lived nearer the light of facts, is capable of blaming the Revolution on the dynasty's want of family solidarity. Occasionally she attributes the misfortunes of the empress to her "tactlessness." Rasputin is briefly described, and it is delicately mentioned that the empress's mind was overstrained, but, on the whole, the book's preoccupation is with who should be Mistress of the Robes, life at Tsarskoie Selo, and jewelled details of the imperial toilette. The sternest realities of

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

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

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that world were indiscreet Grand-ducal marriages and Alexandra's dislike of her mother-in-law. No wonder that the Revolution was a rudeness uncomprehended. At first Alexandra would not believe that impious pressure had been applied to the Tsar, and that he had abdicated both for himself and for her son. Later on she kept referring to the "cruel humiliation" inflicted on her when she, Empress of Russia, had been made to stand up while Kornilov read to her the will of the people. The book ends with the departure of "Colonel and Mrs. Romanov" for Siberian exile, a tragic scene, yet one can not help noting, from frequent reference to Marie Antoinette, that Alexandra and her biographer were somewhat consoled by the fact that they could follow royal precedent even in these trying circumstances.

The National Budget System and American Finance, by Charles Wallace Collins. New York: Macmillan, $1.25.

AMERICA alone among the civilized nations gets on without a systematically prepared budget. In time of peace we spend more than any other nation, but we have no machinery for enforcing unity and proportion and national purpose in our expenditures. Our national finance is disorderly and wasteful: nothing but the exuberance of our revenue sources has kept us out of financial straits. On all this the experts are agreed, but the opinion of experts will never of itself convert to sounder methods the Congressmen and Senators who can fish post-offices and river and harbor appropriations out of our troubled financial waters. Reform can be had within the Constitution by the adoption of a few simple expedients of concentration of budgetary responsibility upon the President and self-limitation of House and Senate to the natural functions of criticism and control. But reform must wait upon the wide diffusion of intelligent public opinion, and this in turn must wait upon the multiplication of books like Mr. Collins' National Budget System, which is clear, brief and readable. It does not aspire to originality or comprehensiveness, but it offers sufficient material upon the budgetary practice of foreign countries and of the United States to enable the reader to form a solid judgment of his own as to the urgent need for reform.

A Book Without a Title, by George Jean Nathan. New York: Philip Goodman Co. Ninety cents.

THAT artists are vain, that love is fatuous, that pollen rubs off a butterfly's wing and powder off a chorus-girl's nose—Mr. Nathan writes seventy-four separate little reflections on these and equally novel themes; typographically separate, that is, for their banality is as uniform and continuous as cheap vaudeville. It is a pity that Mr. Nathan cannot be discouraged from trying to imitate La Rochefoucauld, his passion for the author of the Maxims is so evidently that of the moth for the star.

Contributors

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

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